How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment

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  1. On this movement, see Stewart (2003).

  2. Shapiro, Smith, and Masoud (2004).

  3. On consensus as an indicator of evaluation and status, see Cole (1992).

  4. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).

  5. See, for instance, http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/Qualitative
    MethodsAPSA.html.

  6. For an illustration, see http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm (accessed
    July 8, 2008).

  7. Breslau and Yonay (1999). Nevertheless, the definition of the disciplin-
    ary consensus of economics varies across countries. See in particular
    Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) and Fourcade (2009).

  8. Personal communication, February 19, 2007.

  9. On this process, see Fourcade (2006). The author’s analysis stresses
    the universalism of economic knowledge, the rhetoric of quantification, and
    mathematical formalism as bases for disciplinary homogenization and con-
    sensus building. On divisions within economics, see Breslau in Steinmetz
    (2005); on formalism, see Lawson in Steinmetz (2005).

  10. National Opinion Research Center (2006).

  11. Scott (2001).

  12. Cole (1992).

  13. Fish (1980).

  14. Pragmatic Fairness

  15. Of these panelists, 97 percent explicitly or implicitly affirmed the integ-
    rity of the review process. Only two respondents voiced major reservations.
    But 54 percent qualified this positive judgment with minor reservations, per-
    taining most frequently to procedural fairness, the intrinsic fallibility of the
    process (“we may overlook something”), and epistemological bias. These “mi-
    nor objectors” also described problems tied to (in decreasing order) ideologi-
    cal fairness, elitism, hesitancy, and lack of quality. Concern for procedural
    fairness seemed to occur when unfair results were explained by procedural
    failures or domineering personalities.

  16. The Bourdieusian approach to academic discourse shows how seem-
    ingly disinterested positions are in fact interested (for example, Bourdieu



  1. and denounces these hidden interests (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
    My approach, in contrast, draws on Goffman’s analysis of frames to prob-


Notes to Pages 96–109 / 275
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