The Economist November 20th 2021 53
Middle East & Africa
JihadisminAfrica
Sahel in a handbasket
W
hen un peacekeepersroll out into
the sand and scrub beyond their bas
es in Gao in northern Mali, locals loosen
veils and light cigarettes. When British
peacekeepers camped near one village,
people held a joyous wedding with danc
ing and singing, both of which had waned
under the influence of the jihadists bat
tling for control of the area. Outgunned by
the British detachment, the insurgents “try
to be where we are not”, says Major Gavin
Hudson, one of its officers.
In much of northern Mali the state and
its security forces are completely absent.
So when the blue helmets move on, safety
goes with them. At dusk one evening in Au
gust jihadists swept into the town of Outta
gouna, about 170km (106 miles) from Gao.
They gunned down at least 54 young men.
Peacekeepers arrived the next morning
but, laments Major Hudson, they were too
late to be of much use.
The biggest Western fight against jiha
dists is now in Mali, Niger and Burkina Fa
so. France has about 5,000 soldiers fight
ing in the region, backed by about 1,000
American troops. Hundreds of European
commandos help them and train the Mali
an army. The unhas almost 15,000 peace
keepers. Yet even with these forces arrayed
against them, the insurgents have spread
relentlessly across Mali and deep into
neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso.
More than 2m people have been forced
from their homes and more than 10,000
killed in the past two years (see chart).
In short, the region’s governments and
their Western backers are slowly losing the
war. Many of the reasons can be seen in
Mali, where the insurgency first took root
under a corrupt government focused on
the capital, Bamako, at the expense of the
rest of the country. Across much of Mali
there are no police, judges, teachers or nur
ses. unpeacekeepers recently flew a re
gional governor to a village in the north
east to meet his people. For one 61yearold
villager it was the first time in his life he
had ever seen anyone representing the
state. In 2018 fully 75% of civil servants (in
cluding teachers and nurses) were in the
capital, on which the government sho
wered 80% of its spending even though it
is home to roughly 13% of the population.
The authorities have, in effect, outsourced
the war to France and the un, withdrawing
their forces from large parts of the country.
In areas where there is no state and crimi
nality is rife, jihadists are able to win sup
port by offering justice, even if it is brutal.
In Burkina Faso and Niger, too, jihadists
flourish in places where the state is absent
or where they have been able to force it out.
Since 2018 insurgents in the borderlands
between the three countries have assassi
nated or abducted 300 officials, communi
ty leaders and their family members.
Most analysts argue that the jihadists
will not be beaten by force alone, and that
improved governance and economic de
velopment are essential to win the state le
gitimacy. But where to start with a state
that has done so much to delegitimise it
self? In 2020, after the government
claimed victory in a dodgy legislative elec
tion, thousands of people took to the
B AMAKO AND GAO
The fight against Muslim extremists is going badly in Mali
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