The intermediate stage, manana, is the reasoning which interests us here as
properly theological reasoning. It opens in both directions – toward sacred word
and toward meditation, constrained by scriptural boundaries and oriented to a
completion in religious practice – yet it remains recognizably logical, aimed at
understanding, assertive of truth claims which are to some extent generalizable,
accessible to argument and critique. Other kinds of reasoning, such as might
operate mainly in terms of an analysis of human experience or simply in terms
of repetition of scriptural claims without analysis, can be accounted for by other
terms, e.g., as philosophy or as confessional religious testimony.
In numerous contexts Hindu thinkers sought to defend the possibility of and
need for rational reflection on faith issues, aiming at a delicate balance. Ratio-
nalists, including some philosophers, may argue that reasoning should proceed
simply in terms of questions, problems, and doubts which can be resolved strictly
on logical grounds, and that all other matters are less intellectual matters, of
religious sentiment. Religious conservatives may insist that the Veda is totally
clear, coherent, and need not be subjected to any critical examination. Against
both positions, the theological mean represented by mananaholds the view that
faith can be reasonable, yet still faith; thinking can submit to scripture, yet still
be thinking.
To illustrate how this reasoning was understood in the Hindu context I will
draw on three texts, two classical and one modern, which indicate respectively
how there is a reality, beyond texts, which can be known; how even the truth of
scripture can be argued; how theological reasoning is submissive to revelation. I
begin with several of the va ̄rtikasof Sures ́vara (ninth century) on S ́an.kara’s
commentary on the Br.hada ̄ran.yaka Upanis.ad2.4.5. Sures ́vara explains how the
four seeming injunctions – “it must be seen, it must be heard, it must be reasoned
about, it must be meditated on” – form a single integral enjoined activity.^24 He
says that while the “seeing” mentioned in the Upanis.ad (“it must be seen”)
cannot be enjoined, the means to that seeing – i.e., the “hearing” of the
Upanis.adic texts, and the intellectual consideration of those texts – can be
enjoined as the necessary means. This appropriate, always subsequent “reason-
ing” focuses on the direct and implied meanings of scriptural texts and similar
issues. Conformed to the words of the Veda, it aims at determining the relation-
ship between verbal expressions and what is expressed by them. Revelation is the
source of liberative vision, but (with a teacher’s help) one must understand scrip-
ture first. Neither does reasoning conclude merely in understanding texts, since
the primary claim, “one should see,” also indicates a desire to know reality in its
essence. Were the goal simply the experience of insight, without an objective
referent, the requirement that one must reason about the meaning of scripture
would have no point. Reasoning must therefore open into meditation.
Thus, to draw on another familiar Veda ̄nta text as an example, the Veda ̄nta
student must inquire into the meaning of “that” (tat) and “thou” (tvam) in the
Cha ̄ndogyaphrase “that thou art” (tat tvam asi). The goal of this inquiry is to
learn about the nondual nature of reality itself. This reasoning opens into that
accomplishment of vision which “dawns” subsequently in meditation, like the
458 francis clooney, sj