rising sun. Based in revelation and open to a more experiential completion, this
reasoning, supported by both the Cha ̄ndogyaandBr.hada ̄ran.yakaUpanis.ads, is a
reasoning which we can call theological reasoning.
A second interpretation ofmananais drawn from the introduction to the
Nya ̄yakusuma ̄ñjaliof Udayana (tenth century), specifically a section of Vard-
hama ̄na’s Praka ̄s ́acommentary in which Vardhama ̄na explores the kind of
inquiry that is possible and appropriate when God is the topic of inquiry. In
agreement with other commentators on Udayana’s text, Vardhama ̄na seeks to
justify the kind of inquiry that Udayana undertakes in his treatise; he too is con-
cerned to defend it against views which would make reasoning about God unvi-
able: i.e., God is so well known that there is nothing to think about; everybody
knows something about God, but nobody can speak with certainty, so it is all a
matter of opinion; scripture is so perfectly informative that there is no need to
think about God at all, since one already knows.
Vardhama ̄na discusses the Br.hada ̄ran.yakainjunction to think – “one should
reason on it” in light of its implications for reasoning that is submissive to the
Upanis.ads, and specifically with regard to whether it is even possible to argue
about “God.” Following the intuition which underlies the Nya ̄yakusuma ̄ñjali, he
wants to explain the inquiry into God as respecting scripture without treating it
as inadequate, yet too without allowing it to snuff out thinking; respecting
common opinions while critiquing them; and not projecting knowledge of God
as merely the ever-receding horizon of inquiry.
Vardhama ̄na argues that the inquiry into the existence of God which is taken
up in the Nya ̄yakusuma ̄ñjaliis a real inquiry, not simply a review of positions
already known by faith. While some observers might be tempted to reverse the
sequence of “hearing” and “reasoning” and give preference to reasoning, such
that scripture is to be consulted only for clarification, it is more plausible, given
the sequence found in the Br.hada ̄ran.yakatext – “it must be heard, it must be rea-
soned about” – that the study of the texts comes first, and that reflection is sub-
sequent to that study. It is economical to see this reasoning as focused on textual
interpretation and not more broadly on the wider variety of aspects of “God”
that might come to mind. Were the objects of “it must be heard” and “it must
be reasoned about” different, then no real progress could be made by combining
the study of texts with reasoning. The implication is rather that real exegesis
must lead to real reasoning.
It is true, Vardhama ̄na concedes, that religious people may not have doubts
about God, since there is nothing to be learned about the lord which is not in
scripture, and since what scripture says about the lord is reliable knowledge.
Mananamust therefore be respectful reasoning, which does not call into ques-
tion the authority of the scriptures. Indeed, there would be no motive to think
about scriptures were they not authoritative. But neither is this reasoning merely
an explication of the texts which sorts out what is to be taken literally over
against what is metaphorical. Rather, reasoning aims at grasping the texts’
meanings more precisely, even while never doubting their truth. Moreover,
doubts can arise. Even if one may not doubt God’s existence, one can take
restoring “hindu theology” as a category 459