specifically Hindu conceptual categories regarding the Indian state, a manifesto
that permitted conventional political calculations for the attainment of democ-
ratically accredited power. In short, the issue was what Hinduism could possibly
mean in politics. The strongest and most ideological response was that Hinduism
was the source of a collective transformation that could also transform the very
nature of the Indian polity. In contrast, more instrumentalist politicians tended
to represent Hindutva, in contrast, as (merely) the source of cultural ideas with
which to interpret (and justify) actions within the existing polity.
The idea that Hindutva implied a transformation of the Indian polity appealed
to those who were willing to challenge the current constitutional and procedural
arrangments. That willingness manifested itself in hostility towards Muslims
and Christians, along with conservative resistance to the perceived influence
of the West on Indian social and economic life. Agitation for the removal of
mosques from other favored Hindu sites continued, despite the wrangles and
wider concerns following the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya. The
standard demands for a “uniform civil code” (the removal of special protection
for Muslim personal law from legal generality), and the ending of special laws
on property pertaining to the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir, continued to
be made. Some attention also began to be directed at (especially Western-funded
missionary activity directed at) conversion to Christianity represented yet again
as a threat to Hindu culture. (This was an issue that was to be become much
more critical by the end of the decade.) Against the backdrop of a wider nativist
rejection of the economic liberalization that was occurring under a reformist
Congress regime, Hindu nationalist organizations targeted, in particular, (mostly
Western) multinational corporations entering the long-protected Indian con-
sumer industry. All these were presented as struggles over the Hindu soul of
India, threatened as it was held to be from within through the religious minor-
ities and from without through Western materialist culture.
In the mid-1990s, the BJP attempted to retain the support of those who had
been mobilized through appeal to the “hard” Hindu nationalism of the rest of
the Sangh Parivar, even while it sought to appeal to those segments of the elec-
torate more concerned with issues of efficiency (anticorruption, administrative
competence, economic liberalization) than with religious identity. In pursuit of
the latter, there was a projection of the BJP – especially in the form of Atal Bihari
Vajpayee – as the party of good governance. After Congress under Narasimha
Rao lost power, the BJP sought to position itself as the only alternative. But even
its diversified strategy failed to bring it sufficient direct electoral support. At the
same time, other parties, national and regional (with the exception, of course,
of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena in Maharashtra), adhered to the “secularist”
conception of politics, and refused to contemplate electoral alliances with the
BJP. When given a chance, the BJP lasted less than a fortnight in government for
lack of partners to form a coalition.
This experience was sufficient for the BJP to persuade itself that its best
chance of success lay in pursuing the “soft” strategy of focusing on issues of gov-
ernance rather than ideology. The Hindu vote bank mobilized through violence-
contemporary political hinduism 543