based confrontational ideology, as on Ayodhya, would have nowhere else to go,
while the chance of increasing votes in a wider constituency would only come
through pursuing issues of governance. But beyond the votes themselves
(which, even when maximized, might still not be enough) any hope of power lay
with alliances, and alliance partners would be tempted only by a less ideologi-
cally motivated BJP.
As the “Third Front” of parties that came to power in 1996 found themselves
unable to provide stability over a full term of Parliament, elections had to be
called again. The failure of an alliance without the BJP made it look necessary
- and the “soft” strategy of the BJP made it look possible – for many parties to
think of dealing with it. The BJP’s share of the vote in the next General Election
went up slightly, although it still got less that 30 percent of the popular vote. It
won the largest number of seats; but well short of a majority, so that it needed
to put together a precarious coalition in order to form a government.
Democratic power and its constraints
By 1998, “Hindu nationalists” were in power in India. But what did that mean?
Clearly, the Indian polity was not going to be transformed constitutionally or
even culturally. The electoral arithmetic saw to that. There were too many politi-
cal forces to constrain the core impulses of Hindutva, besides the divergences
within Hindutva itself. This was most evident in economic policy: Jaswant Singh,
a long-standing member of the BJP in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in the past,
was perceived by the RSS and others to be too unideological and reform-minded
to be allowed to hold the key post of Finance Minister. (He became [an influen-
tial] External Affairs Minister instead.) But the economic imperatives had to be
met and the BJP-led coalition had perforce to continue the same inconsistent but
liberalizing policies of the two previous regimes. This set the BJP-in-government
against other organizations within the Parivar, whose instinctive nativism made
them protectionist and antireformist. On other issues too, the strength of un-
sympathetic allies compelled the BJP to give up formally (in the government
agenda) its traditional Hindutva demands. Ironically, when Hindu nationalists
attained power, it could only be on terms that allowed little space for Hindu
nationalism.
The decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 seemed on the face of it to be
at least one unqualifiedly Hindu nationalist decision. Certainly, both supporters
and opponents of the BJP often saw it as driven by the desire to express the
strength of a Hindu nation. But the reality was more complex. Previous gov-
ernments had come close to conducting the tests, and the defense establishment
had consistently argued for tests and been heard sympathetically by previous
Prime Ministers. Of course, it was seen as being of immediate domestic advan-
tage to conduct the tests and ride a (rapidly diminishing) wave of nationalism.
But what kind of nationalism – Hindu or Indian? Traditionalists in the BJP party
hierarchy, and in the RSS and VHP, read the tests as expressing Hindu greatness,
544 c. ram-prasad