have in such an approach, while criticizing the practice of equating ratio-
nality with maximization in economic theory: “the lesson is that the ratio-
nality hypothesis is by itself weak. To make it useful, the researcher is tempted
into some strong assumptions” (1987:206). The assumptions guiding Stark
and Iannaccone have begun to emerge above, and now they merit more direct
comment.
It is instructive to note how the conclusions of these theorists echo the free
market assumptions of contemporary neo-conservative economics. Simplifying
secularization once again, Stark argues that state-funded clergy work less
hard, which is why their churches are in decline (1997b:185). In other words,
government civil servants are lazy, while the entrepreneur is successful; “reli-
gious professionals, like anyone else, do not exert themselves unless they need
to do so – in the absence of eager competitors, religious organizations will
be lax and inefficient” (191, emphasis added). So, it seems, Stark is comfort-
able asserting that allhuman beings are only motivated by threat and com-
petition. The diversity and complexity of human behavior is swept aside by
this assertion, and it is most intriguing to note the extent to which such a
statement resembles the rhetoric often found in criticisms of the welfare state
and Keynesian economics.
Similar assumptions can be found in the work of Lawrence Iannaccone.
He credits greater “efficiency” for the strength of more doctrinally conserv-
ative and morally strict Christian churches in the United States. For Iannaccone,
religion is a “commodity” produced collectively. In a voluntaristic and less
rigid community, some individuals are able to benefit from the services of a
church, without contributing significantly. Such “free riders” effectively “take
more than they give” (1994:1183–1185). Since he assumes that time is money,
Iannaccone argues that churches with higher average salaries have a shorter
worship service (1995:79), and that shared-faith marriages result in a higher
level of church attendance than “mixed” denominational marriages because
“partners of the same religion can produce religious commodities more
efficiently.” Why? Because they benefit from economies of scale: “The same
car drives everyone to church; there is no question as to how time and money
contributions will be allocated to different religions” (1990:301). For Iannaccone,
“subscribing to a religion is a bit like buying stock” (1995:81). But imaging
that couples agree to practice the same religion because it saves on travel
expenses is about as profound as suggesting that, if the men in the bar avoid
164 • Christopher Craig Brittain