the more attractive blond woman, they can have their pick of any other “grate-
ful” mate.
In conclusions such as these, theory can be said to be shaping the scholar ’s
interpretation of religion, rather than empirical data or critical analysis. For
in their “supply side” approach to religion, both Stark’s and Iannaccone’s
presuppositions parallel in rather striking ways the assumptions of contem-
porary neoconservative politics and economic theory. The neoconservative
agenda is one that opposes state-led economic development, while encour-
aging deregulation and corporate initiative. It is assumed that market expan-
sion is what drives innovation and prosperity. Government programs are said
to result inevitably in inefficiency and stagnation, and it is presupposed that
all human behavior is motivated solely by a concern to maximize self-inter-
est. This being the case, governments should simply encourage private cap-
ital formation and a risk-taking entrepreneurial culture among its population.
A statement by George Gilder sums up the emphasis of “supply-side” eco-
nomic policy; “The so-called means of production are impotent to generate
wealth and progress without creative men of production, the entrepre-
neurs...They are the heroes of economic life” (quoted in Devigne 1994:144).
In “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the ‘Secularization’ of Europe” (1994),
Stark and Iannaccone propose a “theory of religious mobilization” that demon-
strates once again the extent to which their approach to religion echoes these
neoconservative assumptions. Their theory intends to account for lower church
attendance and belief in European nations. It focuses on the behavior of reli-
gious “firms,” as opposed to changing attitudes among “religious consumers.”
Thus, in opposition to the “secularization thesis,” Stark and Iannaccone pre-
sent a “supply-side” explanation for declining participation in religious orga-
nizations. It is not the result of a decline in “demand” for religion (which,
they claim, remains a constant), but of problematic behavior on the part of
religious “suppliers.” They argue, for example, that the problem with religion
in Scandinavian societies is that the churches there amount to government-
sponsored monopolies (in the form of recognized national church organiza-
tions). But supply-side economic theory encourages deregulation and the
development of a competitive free market, and so the rational choice approach
of these two authors does likewise. The problem with religion in Scandinavia
is that religious suppliers have created a rigid and inefficient market; “only
a few, lazy religious firms confront the potential religious consumer.” The
From A Beautiful Mindto the Beautiful Soul • 165