PETER VAN DER VEERtainers are usually described, and Fortuyn precisely fitted that image. He could say things
in a strident manner and combined a feminine vulnerability with a sharp and entertaining
irony. Being gay was also important to the content of his politics, since he always saw
himself as an outsider who was capable of expressing the feelings of those who felt ex-
cluded from power. In this sense, Fortuyn fitted the classic definition of the populist. To
an unprecedented degree, he brought his personal life into politics, and the public re-
sponded with emotional sympathy.
Fortuyn had had a checkered career. He studied sociology and became a student
activist and fanatical Marxist during the 1960s. His first job was as a lecturer in Marxist
sociology at the University of Groningen, and his syllabi were filled with the writings of
Lenin. Later, Fortuyn transformed himself into a spokesman for the silent majority and
entrepreneurial Holland. He wrote a column for a right-wing weekly and became a media
personality. In sum, he followed a very common trajectory from the radical left to neo-
conservative. Despite his new emphasis on entrepreneurship, he was not an entrepreneur
but a member of the managerial and media class. In the 1990s, Fortuyn railed against
politicians of the established parties, who he claimed had abandoned their voters, did not
care about the people, and were indecisive, uninspiring technocrats. This was evident in
the way they dealt with Muslim immigration into the country: the common people were
not protected against the influx of criminal foreigners, who threatened the hard-won
freedoms of the Dutch. Fortuyn was vocal especially in defense of individual sexual free-
dom, and his public gay identity enabled him perfectly to take up the defense of Dutch
progressive sexual politics against Islamic traditions. Asylum seekers, foreign immigrants,
and especially Islam as a backward religion represented threats to the Dutch way of life,
and it was time to be proud of our advanced nation and defend it. This was the message
that secured Fortuyn top place (over Erasmus and Rembrandt) in a recent poll to deter-
mine the greatest Dutchman in history. This kind of populism had been virtually un-
known in Dutch politics, which had been dominated by coalitions of Christian-Democrat,
Socialist, and Liberal parties for the past century. Politicians outside of these parties with
a direct appeal to the public never stood a chance. How can we explain the unprecedented
success of this kind of populism in the Netherlands? In answering this question, I focus
on the production of a certain cultural politics in the Netherlands after the decline of
religion. This cultural politics feeds on desires and anxieties that make the Dutch incapa-
ble of dealing with globalization and immigration. But first, I must sketch the political
arena in which Fortuyn and, later, Hirsi Ali became so successful.
Dutch Politics at the End of the 1990s
In 1992, the Dutch had been governed for eight years by a so-called purple coalition,
which included the Labor Party and the Liberal Party but excluded the Christian-Democrats,
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