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(C. Jardin) #1
NOTES TO PAGES 314–27

are politics and law, the very domains liberalism treats as primary domains of power. Liberalized
cultures (including the ‘‘societal cultures’’ of liberal society) are considered to generate and circulate
meaning but not power, because liberalization is by definition the devolution of power to the
morally autonomous subject theorized by Kant and Freud, and the secular state theorized by social
contract theorists. Thus, while Kymlicka, more than many other liberals, acknowledges that liberal
societies ‘‘are cultural too,’’ he legitimates the imposition of liberal political values on nonliberals,
i.e., he legitimates liberal imperialism.



  1. George W. Bush, ‘‘State of the Union Address,’’ U.S. Department of State, January 29,
    2002, http://www.state.gov.g/wi/.

  2. The language of non-negotiable demands, borrowed from the lexicon of labor and peace
    talks, is itself curious. Not only does it suggest that the United States is engaged in negotiation
    rather than war, it also positions the United States as righteous supplicant rather than superpower.

  3. Asad,Genealogies of Religion, 257.

  4. There is plenty of intellectual help here. Philosophers as diverse as Jean-Luc Nancy, Em-
    manuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, and Jacques Derrida have offered critiques that
    figure being in terms other than autonomy versus organicism; and post-Nietzscheans such as Mi-
    chel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, and Judith Butler undo the grip of the autonomy-
    organicism binary by pressing a formulation of the subject in terms of ‘‘becoming’’ rather than
    ‘‘being.’’ Edward Said, Talal Asad, David Scott, Lila Abu-Lughod, Saba Mahmood, William E. Con-
    nolly, Ashis Nandy, Partha Chatterjee, Rajiv Bhargava, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, among others,
    have contributed to deconstructing the secularism/fundamentalism opposition. And postcolonial
    and cultural studies scholars too numerous to name have placed pavestones for conceptualizing the
    extraordinary miscegenations among cultural and political forms wrought by late modernity.

  5. Justification is not to be confused with motivation. The current imperial policies of the
    United States are wrought from power-political motivations that have little to do with the human
    rights and antifundamentalist discourses I have been discussing here.


Chantal Mouffe, Religion, Liberal Democracy, and Citizenship



  1. Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), I, 241, p.



  2. Ibid., I, 242, p. 88.

  3. This point is developed in my bookThe Return of the Political(London: Verso, 1993).

  4. I have theorized this distinction inThe Democratic Paradox(London: Verso, 2000).


Lars Tønder, Toleration Without Tolerance: Enlightenment and the Image of Reason


note: The author would like to thank Jane Bennett, William E. Connolly, Thomas Donahue,
Paulina Ochoa, Sacramento Rosello ́Martı ́nez, Matthew Scherer, Helen Tartar, Lasse Thomassen,
Hent de Vries, and two anonymous readers for their comments and suggestions.



  1. Rainer Forst, ‘‘Toleration, Justice and Reason,’’ inThe Culture of Toleration in Diverse Socie-
    ties: Reasonable Tolerance, ed. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione (Manchester: Manchester
    University Press, 2003), 78, emphasis in original. See also: Ju ̈rgen Habermas, ‘‘Intolerance and
    Discrimination,’’International Journal of Constitutional Law1, no. 1 (2003): 2–12; John Rawls,


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