NOTES TO PAGES 346–48fields’’ (‘‘The House That Jack Built: Thirty Years of Reading Rawls,’’Ethics113, [January 2003]:
367). Consider, as well, Amy Gutmann’s observation that ‘‘Many students read Rawls in their
philosophically formative years and grew up, as it were, with strong Rawlsian sympathies’’ (‘‘The
Central Role of Rawls’s Theory,’’Dissent[Summer 1989], 338).
- Alan Ryan, ‘‘How Liberalism, Politics Come to Terms,’’ inThe Washington Times, May 16,
- For the former development, see Alexander Nehamas, ‘‘Recent Trends in American Philos-
ophy,’’Daedalus126, no. 1 (1997): 209–24, and for the latter, Amy Gutmann, ‘‘The Central Role
of Rawls’s Theory,’’ 338–42. - Stuart Hampshire, ‘‘A New Philosophy of the Just Society,’’New York Review of Books18,
no. 3 (February 24, 1972). - Wolin, ‘‘The Liberal/Democratic Divide,’’ 97.
- Gutmann, ‘‘The Central Role of Rawls’s Theory.’’
- Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 3. - H. L. A. Hart, ‘‘Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,’’ inReading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 230–52. - Michael Sandel, ‘‘Political Liberalism,’’Harvard Law Review107, no. 7 (May 1994): 1765.
- Daniels, ed.,Reading Rawls, xi.
- Laden identifies the persistence of two divergent ‘‘blueprints’’ guiding most of the critical
literature on Rawls: ‘‘The standard blueprint of the structure of Rawls’s work includes four related
elements: (1) Rawls is engaged in a grand philosophical project; (2) in particular, he is developing
a theory in the traditional sense of that word; (3) that theory is Hobbesian in that it starts from an
account of human rationality; and (4) it aims to show the rationality of justice via its centerpiece,
the argument from the original position in favor of the choice of the two principles of justice,’’
whereas, according to ‘‘an alternative blueprint... (1) Rawls’s projects are focused and narrower
than is generally thought; (2) he is engaged in philosophy as defense rather then philosophical
theorizing; (3) his arguments are meant to serve as public justifications rather than as deductions
from premises about human nature or rationality; and (4) the central idea and high point of his
achievement is the idea of public reason and its accompanying picture of political deliberation’’
(‘‘The House That Jack Built,’’ 371, 379). - Rawls writes, ‘‘My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries
to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant.’’ Viewing Hobbes as a difficult case, Rawls declines to associate himself with
that part of the tradition, noting only that, ‘‘for all of its greatness, Hobbes’sLeviathanraises special
problems’’ (Rawls,A Theory of Justice[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971], 11, 11n.4). - For a paradigmatic statement of this standard interpretation of the Enlightenment, see
Immanuel Kant, ‘‘An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?,’ ’’Kant: Political Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); for a concise statement of this theme, which runs
throughout Nietzsche’s works, see, e.g.,The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1974), esp. 279–80 (section 343); for a concise statement of Schmitt’s argument, see
hisPolitical Theology(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 36. - Talal Asad’s work is exemplary here. See esp. ‘‘What Might an Anthropology of Secularism
Look Like?’’ in hisFormations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity(Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 21–66. - Conclusions such as this, taken from an article by Jean Hampton, are all too common in
the literature: ‘‘I hope to have shown that Rawls is incorrect here, that he has been more fully
Kantian than he realizes’’ (The Philosophy of Rawls, ed. Richardson and Weithman, 1:132).
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