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NOTES TO PAGES 348–57

23. This has recently been treated by Paul Ricoeur, ‘‘The Political Paradox,’’ inLegitimacy and
    the State, ed. William E. Connolly (New York: New York University Press, 1984), and by Connolly
    himself in bothPolitical Theory and Modernity(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993) and
    The Ethos of Pluralization(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).


24. Jean-Jacques Rousseau,On The Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St.
    Martin’s, 1978), 46 (bk. 1, chap. 1).


25. Ibid.


26. Ibid., 67 (bk. 2, chap. 6).


27. Ibid., 68 (bk. 2, chap. 7).


28. Immanuel Kant,The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Upper Saddle
    River, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1993), 169 (conclusion; AK 161).


29. Rousseau,On the Social Contract, 70 (bk. 2, chap. 7).


30. Ibid., 69 (bk. 2, chap. 7).


31. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


33. Ibid., 69 (bk. 2, chap. 7).


34. Ibid., 130 (bk. 4, chap. 8).


35. Paul Ricoeur, ‘‘On John Rawls’A Theory of Justice: Is a Pure Procedural Theory of Justice
    Possible?’’International Social Science Journal42 (1990): 555.


36. Hampshire, ‘‘A New Philosophy of the Just Society.’’


37. Aristotle, ‘‘Rhetoric,’’The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols.
    (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:2155 (1356a).


38. Rawls,A Theory of Justice, viii.


39. John Rawls, ‘‘The Sense of Justice,’’Philosophical Review72, no. 3 (July 1963): 305; later
    incorporated, with slight emendations, into sections 70–74 ofA Theory of Justice, 462–90. Page
    numbers refer to the original journal article.


40. Ibid., 304–5.


41. Ibid., 305, emphasis added.


42. Rawls,A Theory of Justice, 485.


43. Rawls, ‘‘The Sense of Justice,’’ 305;A Theory of Justice, 443.


44. John Rawls,Political Liberalism(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), xv.


45. Ibid., 3.


46. Rawls,A Theory of Justice,3.


47. Williams observes the translation of argumentative force from one conversation to the
    next with great precision: Considering a point made in Rawls’s argument from the original position,
    he notes, ‘‘this comes perilously close to a requirement on the original choice, that it be of a system
    whichwill be just—which of course would be to moralise the original itself, and to put in at the
    beginning what we are supposed to get out at the end.’’ Considering the unacknowledged force of
    a Kantian outlook on Rawls’s argument for the strong preference for liberty, he notes, ‘‘the strong
    preference for liberty is part of the outlook in which men are in general seen as essentially autono-
    mous beings, and Rawls is disposed to explicate it in terms of a Kantian view of human relations.
    This view is not supposed to be that of his contracting parties, but the choice they are pictured as
    making seems—to put it mildly—to make most sense when they are understood as already possess-
    ing this view of themselves’’; concerning the unacknowledged influence of altruistic, hence moral-
    ized, assumptions, he notes, ‘‘the contracting parties were indeed introduced as fathers of families,
    with a natural concern for one generation ahead, but the way in which Rawls speaks of their
    commitment to not taking risks implies a heavier, and surely already moralised, onus of responsibil-

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