DISCRIMINATIONThe broadest sociological definitions of dis-
crimination assume that racial minorities, women,
and other historical target groups have no inher-
ent characteristics that warrant inferior social out-
comes. Thus, all inequality is seen as a legacy of
discrimination and a social injustice to be reme-
died. By contrast, political conservatives favor a far
narrower definition that limits the concept’s scope
by including only actions intended to restrict a
group’s chances. For solid conceptual reasons,
sociologists seldom follow suit (but see Burkey
1978, p. 79). First, an intentionality criterion re-
turns the concept to the realm of psychology and
deflects attention from restraining social struc-
ture. Second, the invisibility of intentions creates
insuperable obstacles to documenting discrimination.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISCRIMINATIONSociologists’ understanding of intricate societal
patterns sensitizes them to the fact that disadvan-
tage accruing from intentional discrimination typi-
cally cumulates, extends far beyond the original
injury, and long outlives the deliberate perpetra-
tion. Many sociologists distinguish between direct
and indirect discrimination (Pettigrew 1985). Di-
rect discrimination occurs at points where ine-
quality is generated, often intentionally. When
decisions are based explicitly on race, discrimina-
tion is direct. Indirect discrimination is the per-
petuation or magnification of the original injury.
It occurs when the inequitable results of direct
discrimination are used as a basis for later decisions
(‘‘past-in-present discrimination’’), or decisions in
linked institutions (‘‘side-effect discrimination’’)
(Feagin and Feagin 1986). Hence, discrimination
is indirect when an ostensibly nonracial criterion
serves as a proxy for race in determining social
outcomes.
To illustrate with wages, direct discrimination
exists when equally qualified blacks and whites or
men and women are paid at different rates for the
same work. Indirect discrimination exists when
the two groups are paid unequally because prior
discrimination in employment, education, or hous-
ing created apparent differences in qualifications
or channeled the groups into better- and worse-
paying jobs. This direct/indirect distinction re-
sembles the legal distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact. While intention-
al direct discrimination may have triggered the
causal chain, the original injury is often perpetu-
ated and magnified by unwitting accomplices.
Intentionality criteria deny that the continuing
disadvantage is a legacy of discrimination.
Years ago, Williams outlined the concept dif-
ferently: ‘‘Discrimination may be said to exist to
the degree that individuals of a given group who
are otherwise formally qualified are not treated in
conformity with these nominally universal institu-
tionalized codes.’’ (Williams 1947, p. 39, italics add-
ed). For Antonovsky (1960, p. 81), discrimination
involves ‘‘... injurious treatment of persons on
grounds rationally irrelevant to the situation’’ (ital-
ics added). Economists use starker terms. Becker
(1968, p. 81) held that economic discrimination
occurs ‘‘... against members of a group whenever
their earnings fall short of the amount ’warranted’
by their abilities’’ (italics added).
Two problems arise with these definitions.
First, the assessment of ‘‘abilities’’ and of what
treatment is ‘‘rationally’’ relevant or ‘‘warranted’’
is no easy task. Critical examination of common
practice uncovers many instances where formal
qualifications and ‘‘nominally universal institutional-
ized codes’’ prove not to provide a logical basis for
distinctions. Employment testing litigation dem-
onstrates that when hiring criteria once legiti-
mized by tradition or ‘‘logic’’ are put to scientific
test, they often fail to predict job performance in
the assumed fashion. Analogous fallacies have been
identified in the conventional wisdom guiding
admission to advanced education. Hence, nomi-
nally universalistic standards may provide an alto-
gether illogical basis for decision making. If such
misguided selection procedures also work to the
disadvantage of historical victims of discrimina-
tion, these practices are not exempted from the
charge of discrimination by their universalistic facade.
The second problem with these definitions is
that they ignore another, prevalent form of in-
direct discrimination. Even where nominally
universalistic standards do serve some legitimate
social function, such as selecting competent work-
ers, adverse impact of these standards on those
who bear the cumulated disadvantage of historical
discrimination cannot be disregarded.
The complexity of discrimination and unre-
solved issues about its definition impede easy ap-
plication of social science methods to inform insti-
tutional policy. Apparently rigorous quantitative