Atheism and Theism 137proposition or set of propositions and its vehicle or embodiment. Once that
distinction is made, however, it is no longer obvious that anything that pos-
sesses reason must exercise this through the manipulation of symbols in space
and time. Indeed once the separation is allowed it is no longer clear that we
must speak of rationality being ‘exercised’ as opposed to being timelessly
possessed. Likewise, the idea of thought conjoining and opposing various
elements seems to belong to the sphere of psychology rather than to that of
reasonper se. Yet it is precisely reason as such, and not an empirical psycho-
logy, that we are led to ascribe to a transcendent cause on the basis of order
observed in nature.
8 God, Good and Evil
Obviously the existence of God could not be proved if there were a sound
argument to show that there is no God. Prime candidates for such an argu-
ment are proofs from evil. The general form of these proofs is as follows:
(1) The idea of God is that of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omnis-
cient being.
(2) If such a being existed then there would be no evil.
(3) There is evil.
(4) Therefore no such being (as God) exists.
Any adequate assessment of this argument requires that one think a good
deal about the precise content of the claims involved; and it would be fair to
say that there is no general agreement on what the theist is or is not com-
mitted to in his account of the divine attributes, and of what the nature of evil
might be. There are, however, a number of points to be made.
First, then, it is customary to distinguish between naturalandmoral
evils, that is to say between bad events, processes and states of affairs the
existence of which is a result of the operation of natural causes, and occur-
rences and situations whose badness results from or consists in the thoughts
and actions of intelligent beings. If I am struck by a falling branch and my
neck is broken that is a natural evil; if you strike me and break my neck that
is a moral one. This contrast may suggest that the evil is the same in each
case – a broken neck – and that the difference lies in the varying causes; but
that is not quite right. The natural evil is the misfortune (to me) of my neck
being broken; the moral evil is the fact that someone should be motivated to
harm me. Certainly this fact is bad news for me, but its moral badness
attaches to the state of mind of my attacker – the moral evil consists in his
malevolence not in my broken neck. In both cases the evil to me is a state of