138 J.J. Haldane
nature (a fractured bone) but in the attack there is the additional evil of
a malevolent heart.
Second, when people think of natural evils they mostly have in mind
physical and organic damage and defects caused by catastrophic events or
diseases: destruction through earthquake, fire and tempest; abnormality,
illness and pain, and so on. It is worth adding, however, that as well as
inorganic and physiological evils there are psychological and cognitive ones
such as pathological depression, and imbecility and ignorance. If it is a bad
thing that people are physically sick, it is also a bad thing that they should
be psychologically ill, and uncomprehending about matters of personal and
of general importance. Indeed, one might speak of an atheist ‘proof from
ignorance’ parallel to that from evil, but given that ignorance is itself a bad
condition it is better to regard this as a special case of the argument from evil.
Looking at the argument above, a theist might be tempted to resist the
conclusion by rejecting premiss (3). There are religious believers who claim
that the appearance of evil is an illusion but this is wholly at odds with our
experience, and at a deeper level it seems to be self-contradictory. If evil is an
illusion then anyone who supposes it is real, as most of us do, is in ignorance;
but, as we saw, ignorance is a bad state of affairs. Thus either our impressions
of evil are veridical or they are illusory; if they are veridical there is evil and if
they are illusory there is evil; ergo there is evil. In a moment I shall consider
a somewhat different reservation about the reality of evil but it should be clear
that any attempt simply to deny that bad things happen is easily refutable.
Another and more promising response to the argument is to query premiss
(2). Suppose we agree that whatever the other purported divine attributes, the
theistic idea of God is of a being that wills only the good, is almighty and is
all knowing. Suppose also that it is accepted that there are natural and moral
evils. Does the latter fact imply the non-existence of the theistic God? Some
writers seem to have thought so; but there is certainly no logical incompat-
ibility between the claim that there is an omnibenevolent, omnipotent and
omniscient God and the assertion that there is evil – any more than there is
between the claims that there are cats and that there are mice. However, as in
the latter case, it might be thought that given the existence of the one thing
the other will be excluded. Something about cats – their strong tendency to
hunt and kill small animals – is at odds with the existence of mice; likewise,
it is supposed, something about God is at odds with the existence of evil.
This is the point of premiss (2): to assert the incompatibility of God and
evil. Why, then, should one accept that assertion? The familiar answer is that
a being who is wholly good and has irresistible power and comprehensive
knowledge would not let evil occur or would act to overcome it.
Theodicies (Gk. theos( god) dike( justice)) are attempts to show why (2) is
false, or equivalently, how the existence of evil is compatible with that of