76 J.J. Haldane
2 Atheism and Theism
J.J. Haldane
1 Introduction
It is a pleasure to find myself debating with Jack Smart an issue of
fundamental theoretical and practical importance. Smart is one of the
most distinguished and respected philosophers of his generation and his
work has long been associated with the intellectual virtues of clarity, honesty,
fairness and modesty. Early in his introduction he avows his commitment
to scientific method, and more generally to the idea that ‘plausibility in the
light of total science is an important guide to metaphysical truth’. I shall
be discussing this idea later; but for now I note that he goes on to say that
he would attempt to ‘explain or explain away putative non-scientific ways of
knowing’ among which he includes appeal to ‘the assumptions of common
sense’. There is some irony in this since one thing that Smart has often
brought to philosophical discussions is sharp reminders of what we ordinarily
believe and of what is implicit within this, reminders intended to deflate
and perhaps even to refute what have seemed to him the wilder claims of
metaphysics.
An example of this comes later in chapter 1 where he objects to the
philosophical thesis that material objects are just constructs of subjective
experience, offering the counter that the best explanation of the regularities in
our observation is ‘the real actual existence of the physical objects postulated
by science (and also those implicit in common sense)’ – the latter emphasis is
mine. When push comes to shove Smart would probably give priority to
science over common sense, a policy I shall question later; but I observe that
for him common sense is at least a reasonable, if not an infallible resource
when it comes to assessing metaphysical theses.
Atheism and Theism, Second Edition
J.J.C. Smart, J.J. Haldane
Copyright © J.J.C. Smart and J.J. Haldane, 1996, 2003