Atheism and Theism 77In this respect, and in the robustness of his own sense of the real, he
reminds me of figures in our common intellectual ancestry, viz. the Scottish
‘Common Sense Realists’ – most famously Thomas Reid (1710 – 96) whose
best known writings are directed against the philosophical scepticism of his
fellow-Scot, and arguably the greatest British born philosopher, viz. David
Hume (1711–76). In those days, particularly in Scotland, philosophers debated
issues of general importance in styles that were intended to be accessible, so
far as possible, to the educated reader. In this century, however, and especially
since the Second World War, philosophy has become resolutely academic
and professional. There have been clear gains from this and from the asso-
ciated trend towards specialization; but there have also been real losses, one
of which is the unwillingness or inability of many philosophers to engage in
wide-ranging but serious discussions in a manner accessible to those who are
not already familiar with a specific agenda or technical vocabulary. Smart is
an exception to this, and chapter 1 is a good example of how one can range
far, making points that are of general interest, while observing professional
standards of clarity and rigour. I shall try to emulate his good example.
We would hardly be ‘in debate’ if we did not hold opposing views, and
given the depth and extent of the issues encompassed by atheism and theism
it will be no surprise that there is much about which we disagree. Never-
theless I want to begin by emphasizing a point of common conviction. I do
so not for the sake of initial courtesies, but because the point in question
is a central philosophical thesis, now much controverted, and because it is
intimately connected with my commitment to theism – and, indeed, with
Smart’s attachment to atheism. This is the belief in metaphysical realism:
the idea that there exists a world independent of any finite mind and that
the nature of this mind-independent world is something it possesses
independently of and prior to its description by common sense, science or
philosophy.
Smart is a metaphysical realist and so am I. We differ in what exactly we
think reality is like and more relevantly we differ over the question of whether
reality is to be explained as the creation of a divine being or is something
whose existence and fundamental character call for no explanation. But
although these are major disagreements we find ourselves united in opposing
a strong anti-realist current in contemporary philosophy. Anti-realism is the
view (or rather, a grouping of views) that ‘reality’ is not independent of us, in
particular of our ways of thinking. One kind of anti-realism is the ‘pheno-
menalism’ discussed by Smart and mentioned above. Another is ‘ontological
relativism’ – the idea that there is no saying what exists independently of
some scheme of classification. This is not the harmless claim that unless
we have the means to describe things – the relevant concepts and words – we
can’t describe them; but rather the striking thesis that the things in question