TheEconomistDecember18th 2021 Finance&economics 57
marketssuchfundstoendinvestors.
Thebeliefthatprivatereturnswillbe
superiorreflectsavariety ofcontestable
arguments:thatinvestorscanearnan“illi
quidity premium” for having money
lockedupinassetsthatdonottradefreely,
say,orthatprivatemarketsarelesseffi
cientthan publicones, allowingskilled
managerstoexhibitconsistentoutperfor
mance.Scepticsthinkthatopaqueprivate
marketsallowmanagerstomaskhighle
verageandvolatility.Fornow,themagic
formulaisworking.Somebiginvestorsre
port annual returns in the midteens
acrossprivateassetclassesthisyear,with
thoseonpeabove50%.Bycomparison,the
s&p500,anindexofAmericanstocks,has
produceda returnof24%.
Luredbyhighreturns,someinvestors
arekeentobemoredirectlyinvolvedin
runningprivateassets,ratherthanbeing
passivecustomersofthebigprivatecapi
talmanagers.apg, a Dutchpensionman
agerthatoversees$703bn,aimstoownat
least1015%ofeveryfunditbacks,soasto
negotiateveto rightsoverstrategicmat
ters,saysPatrickKanters,itsprivatemar
ketsboss.Manybiglimitedpartnersalso
“coinvest” alongside funds directly in
portfoliocompanies,whichallowsthem
morediscretionoverthesizeoftheirexpo
sure,andlowersoverallfees.Somebypass
managersentirely.Coanddirectinvest
mentsaresettoreach$265bnthisyear,the
highesteveramountbyfar.Largeinves
torsin“real”assets,whichincludeproper
tyandinfrastructure,have become full
fledged developers, enabling them to
createtheirownpipelineofdeals—wheth
erforstudenthousingorhospitals—and
pocketa fatmargin.
Changingthetune
Yetthescaleoftheboomisalsoa sourceof
unease.Valuationsarecreepingup.Ina
surveyof 71 globalinstitutionscarriedout
byProbitasthisautumn,65%rankedun
healthycompetitionfordealsasthebig
gestrisk,upfrom55%lastyear.Frenetic
activitymeanslessduediligence.Limited
partners (as the ultimate investors in
fundsareknown)havelittletimetoforge
relationshipswithnewmanagersanddi
versify their bets. Some are recruiting
morestaff,triggeringwhatMaximeAucoin
ofcdpqcallsa “warfortalent”.Meanwhile
managersarefeelingrushed,too.“Deci
sionsarebeingmadeonbiggerdollarsin
fewerdays,”notesSteveMoseleyofapfc.
Theamountof“drypower”,thetotalcom
mittedtofundsbutnotyetspent,standsat
arecord $3.3trn.Thepressureto deploy
capitalmeansfundmanagershavelessin
centivetoevaluatepotentialtargetsstrict
ly,ortoturndowndeals.
Alongsidefrothybehaviour,theother
risksaretheeconomyandinterestrates.
For now a roaring American recovery
meansthattheunderlyingperformanceof
thefirmsandassetsthatprivatemanagers
ownisdecent.InNovember,forexample,
Blackstonetoldinvestorsthat,forthefirst
timeever,everyoneofthecompaniesthat
itownedwasexperiencinggrowingrev
enues.Risinginterestratesarea concern,
however,astheycandeflateassetprices,
imposestressonindebtedcompaniesand
make it harder to raise debtto finance
deals.SofartheFederalReserve’spivotto
wardstighteningmonetarypolicyhasnot
roiledcreditmarkets:junkbondyields(a
proxy forinterest rates onriskier debt)
haverisenfrom4%inSeptemberto4.5%
now.Buttherecouldbemoretocome.
Flush with cash amida deal frenzy,
whatis theindustry to do?One option
wouldbetoliquidateportfolios,thatis,to
sellmoreassetsthanitbuys,ineffecttry
ingtocashinsomechipswhenpricesare
high.Asyet,however,thisdoesnotseem
tobehappening.Takethefiguresforthree
bigmanagers,Blackstone,Carlyleandkkr.
Sofarthisyearforevery$1ofassets,inag
gregate, that they have sold, they have
bought $1.30.Although Carlyle is being
morecautiousthantheothertwofirms,
these figures indicate that the industry
overallthinksthegoodtimeswillrollon.
That suggeststhatifthere isanyre
strainingforceintheindustryit istheulti
mateinvestors.Someare hedgingrisks.
Australia’sFutureFundisrebalancingits
realassetportfoliotowards“defensive”as
sets,suchashousingblockswitha diverse
setoftenantsthatit can“buildandholdfor
ever”,saysWendyNorris,itsdeputyinvest
mentchief.Butfewinvestorsthinkthereis
an alternative to alternatives. All those
canvassedbyTheEconomistsaidtheirallo
cationswouldcontinuetoedgeup.Some
havesourmemoriesfromthefinancialcri
sis,whentheyrushedtodumpprivateas
setsata loss,insteadofsnappingupbar
gains.Thistime,evenifthemusicstops,
theywillkeepdancing.n
Uppingthetempo
Global,privateassetsundermanagement,$trn
Source:PitchBook *Unallocated capital †To March 3st
1
12
9
6
3
0
21†1917151311092007
Totalprivateassets
Allocatedcapital
“Drypowder”*
12
9
6
3
0
21†1917151311092007
Byassetclass
Other
Infrastructure
Property
Privatedebt
Privateequity
Siren song
Global, top 25 investors*
Source:Preqin *Byassetsundermanagement †To Dec 2nd
2
10
8
6
4
2
0
152011 21†
Averageallocation
towardsprivate
assets,%oftotal
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
152011 21†
Total allocation
towards private
assets, $trn
Economicsanctions
SWIFT thinking
F
or weeks Russia has been massing
troops and tanks near the Ukrainian
border. Neither talks with nor threats from
the West have stemmed the flow. With
America and its allies loth to commit forc
es, another option is gaining prominence:
cutting Russia off from swift, the messag
ing network used by 11,000 banks in 200
countries to make crossborder payments.
Flicking a switch seems safer than putting
boots on the ground. But it could have dan
gerous consequences.
A first hurdle would be getting swiftto
comply. The cooperative of banks, based
in Belgium, vows to be politically neutral.
Many European countries, such as Germa
ny, do a lot of business with Russia, and
may oppose the plan. But there is a prece
dent. In 2018 America managed to force
swiftto ditch Iranian banks even in the
face of European resistance. America
would probably have its way again. It could
threaten to pull its own banks from swift,
The consequences of excluding Russia
from the global payments system