chapter 7
The matter of mind: Aristotle on the biology of
‘psychic’ processes and the bodily aspects of thinking
1 psychology, biology, and variations
in cognitive performances
Although Aristotle’sOn the Soul(De anima) has for centuries been regarded
as a ‘metaphysical’ rather than a ‘physical’, or as a ‘philosophical’ rather
than a ‘scientific’, work, there seems nowadays to be a consensus among
students of his psychology as to the thoroughly biological status of the
theory set forth there.^1 This may have to do with recent developments in
the philosophy of mind, but it is probably also related to a reassessment
of the importance of Aristotle’s zoological writings (i.e.History of Animals
(Hist. an.),Parts of Animals(Part. an.),Generation of Animals(Gen. an.),
Progression of Animals(De incessu animalium,IA) andMovement of Animals
(De motu an.)) and to a growing conviction among students of Aristotle’s
biology concerning the interrelatedness of what were traditionally called
the ‘psychological writings’ of Aristotle (i.e.On the Souland parts of the
Parva naturalia) and the zoological works. There also seems to be a general
agreement as to the basic consistency of Aristotle’s psychological theory, or
at least a tendency to explain apparent contradictions betweenOn the Soul
and theParva naturaliaon the one hand, and statements related to the
soul in the zoological writings on the other (or betweenOn the Souland
theParva naturalia, or between different sections of theParva naturalia)
as the result of differences of method, approach, or argumentative strategy
of particular treatises or contexts rather than in terms of a development in
Aristotle’s psychological ideas.^2
This chapter was first published in W. Kullmann and S. Follinger (eds.), ̈ Aristotelische Biologie. Inten-
tionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse(Stuttgart, 1997 ) 221 – 58.
(^1) See, e.g., Kahn ( 1966 ) 46 ff.; Sorabji ( 1974 ) 65 – 6.
(^2) For a convenient summary of the older discussion – initiated by Nuyens ( 1948 ) and applied to the
Parva naturaliaby Drossaart Lulofs ( 1947 ) and Block ( 1961 a) – see Fortenbaugh ( 1967 ) 316 – 27. The
compatibility of ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘hylomorphism’ was stressed by Kahn ( 1966 ); Lef`evre ( 1972 )
and ( 1978 ); and for theParva naturaliaby Wiesner ( 1978 ); and Wijsenbeek-Wijler ( 1976 ). See also
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