Aristotle on the matter of mind 217
( 3 ) Thirdly, there are contexts in which Aristotle is giving a physiological
explanation ofvariationsin the distribution of psychic capacities or in their
performance among various species of animals or types within one species –
variations which, as I said, can be either purposive or without a purpose.
Such a comprehensive analysis is clearly beyond the scope of the present
study. Moreover, the anatomical and physiological aspects of nutrition and
of visual perception have recently been dealt with by Althoff ( 1997 ) and
Oser-Grote ( 1997 ). For these practical reasons, the second part of the
chapter will attempt to apply these general considerations to the high-
est psychic function only, the notoriously tricky subject of thinking and
intelligence.
2 the bodily aspects of thinking
Aristotle’s sketchy and intriguing remarks on$and its relation to the
body inDe an. 3. 4 – 5 have attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and the dis-
cussion on the precise implications of Aristotle’s statements concerning the
incorporeality of the intellect is still continuing.^41 Rather than adding to the
vast amount of secondary literature on that topic, I shall confine myself to
a discussion of a number of passages, mostly from the zoological writings,
but also fromOn the Soulitself, in which Aristotle deals with the physical
aspects of human (and animal) thinking. In order to avoid misunderstand-
ing, it is perhaps useful to say from the outset that I shall be concerned with
the intellectual activity of organisms rather than with the (divine) intellect
itself, that is, with operations of the intellect in human (and to some extent
also animal) cognition.^42 However, this does not mean a restriction to con-
creteactsof thinking (which might be seen as instances of participation by
embodied souls in an incorporeal principle), for some of the passages to be
discussed deal with structures and dispositions rather than with instanta-
neous acts of thinking, that is to say, they also pertain to the level of the ‘first
actuality’. A second preliminary remark is that the focus will be on therole
these physical factors play rather than on the factors themselves: a compre-
hensive and systematic account of all individual factors involved (e.g. the
(^41) For two recent interpretations see Kahn ( 1992 ), especially 366 ff., and Wedin ( 1994 ); see also Wedin
( 1989 ).
(^42) Cf. the distinction between ‘the principle or faculty ofnousas such and its concrete activity in us,
in human acts of thinking’ made by Kahn ( 1992 ) 362 and 367. It should be said, however, that this
distinction is less clear in Aristotle than Kahn suggests; nor is it clear why the distinction between
the principle and its concrete activities does not apply just as well to sensation – and if it does, what
remains of the unique status ofnous. Cf. Frede ( 1992 ) 105 – 7.