254 Aristotle and his school
to -) ) *
8
,oritcan
be connected zeugmatically with"<(‘distinguish’),^54 which has
often, though unnecessarily, been changed intoH<(‘suppose’); in
that case the infinitive
(‘use’) also depends on"<.
Who are ‘those who are intelligent and wise’ (-) )
*)? Several interpreters (Woods ( 1982 ); D ́ecarie ( 1978 ); During ( ̈ 1966 ))
suppose that the ‘irrational people’ (the'
) are meant, that is, the for-
tunate people (() who were the subject of
(‘they
hit the mark without reasoning’) in line 34.^55 But it is very unlikely that
Aristotle should call these people ‘intelligent and wise’ (!
). It seems better (with Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) and von Fragstein ( 1974 ))
to identify these ‘intelligent and wise’ people withs in line 33 , the peo-
ple who possess reason. Aristotle asserts that these people too, just like the
irrational people, have a prophetic capacity which is swift, but in them it
actuallyisdue to reason.^56
The next sentence is taken by nearly all interpreters^57 as if it read(
!, ‘not only’, but ! (means ‘very nearly’, ‘almost’: the construc-
tion ! (p"1qexpresses that we may almost saypbut in any case
q.^58 Aristotle does not want to go so far as to say that there exists such a thing
as rational divination founded on reason, but he does recognise the fact that
some people, by means of experience or habit, perform divination,^59 and
that this kind of divination is different from the irrational process by which
the lucky people foresee the future. Given this interpretation, Dirlmeier’s
( 1962 a) emendation of !into !#can be discarded.is deleted
by all interpreters, but it might be connected with
1
: ‘others
also by habit’. In any caseshould certainly be retained, for the object of
(‘use’) is not*C (‘observation’), which is linguistically an
awkward combination, but
C(‘divination’; cf.% "3 $ !
sc.
): ‘they use divination by habituation in observing’.
(^54) I do not see how Dirlmeier can translate"<as ‘als abgesonderte (einfach) abtun’, for
" <
means ‘to take apart, to distinguish’ (see LSJ s.v.).
(^55) See Woods ( 1982 ) 43 , 183 ;D ́ecarie ( 1978 ) 215 ;During ( ̈ 1966 ) 453.
(^56) See Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 481 ; Effe ( 1970 ) 84 ; von Fragstein ( 1974 ) 376 – 7. The distinction between
rational and irrational divination is made by Plato,Phaedrus 244 a–d; rational divination is referred
to by Aristotle inMem. 449 b 10 and inPol. 1274 a 28.
(^57) Except Jackson ( 1913 ) 198 – 9 , who translates: ‘and it may almost be said that they should put a check
upon the divination which depends on reason. The fact is that some by experience, and others by
habit, have this power.’ However, Jackson’s translation of"<as ‘put a check upon’ is certainly
incorrect (see n. 54 above).
(^58) For this use of ! ( > > > "1cf. Aristophanes,Wasps 515 – 17 : . G (
t
H5 "*0 2 R ! ( "1 -) #.
(^59) Cf. Aristotle’s cautious reference to the idea, expressed by others, that divination is an
#
(Mem. 449 b 12 :A# 5 J
#
0
%
).