Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 255
This interpretation may seem over-subtle, but the interpretations in
which ! > > > (is taken as ‘not only... but’ involve the difficulty that
the structure of the sentence ( ! ( > > > " 5 s 0 s ) would
mark a contrast between the two forms of divination to be distinguished,
whereas such a contrast is lacking in the actual contents of the sentence: for
both experience (
) and habituation (
) seem to belong to
the rational form of divination, a capacity based on some sort of inductive
process of repeated observation and registration. To this it could be objected
that perhaps they do not really belong there, and ( 1 ) we might have to clas-
sify experience and habituation under the irrational form of the divination:
then we would have the contrast, marked by" , with% "3 $
!(sc.
). However, on that interpretation (i) the connection
with the previous sentence, marked by, remains awkward, and (ii) it is
hard to imagine how
and
can be regarded as irrational
activities, for they result in#(‘technical skill’) whereaseutuchiais not
founded on technical skill but on natural talent ( -
) and on irrational
impulses ( ). Alternatively, one might consider ( 2 ) that
is the
rational form,
the irrational form of divination; but objection
(i) would remain, and the word seems peculiar to rational
divination; moreover it seems impossible to regard irrationaleutuchia,
based on natural impulses, as identical or comparable with
%
1
.^60
The interpretation of ! (as ‘almost’ and of
and
as forms of rational divination is at any rate consistent with the following
sentence. InC C . j
we must understand a form of
,
andC Cis the"of line 32 (and of 23 , 25 and 27 ). It is unnecessary
to emend this to*C )C, as Verdenius ( 1971 ), following Spengel, pro-
poses.^61 j
refers to the two types of divination^62 or to the two sub-types
of rational divination,
and
; the first alternative seems
(^60) Habit is explicitly distinguished from nature by Aristotle in what is plainly a reference to (at
Eth. Nic. 1179 b 21 ff.:
5 " R A
s . -
s .
s .
C> 3 . G
- ) P ( 5 8 H
0 " 1
P " # * (
H
. ! 8
% % 5 ( I
-
0 " 1
% $ "$ :% 3 3 *
0 ? % :
3 (cf.Eth. Nic. 1148 a 30 , 1152 a 29 ;Eth. Eud. 1214 a 16 – 21 ). Moreover, as4D
is implicitly
rejected as a possible cause of (in 1247 a 7 – 13 , it is unlikely that
, which is closely
connected with4D
(cf.Rh. 1354 a 7 :
1
"3 4D )), is identical with the psycho-
physiological mechanism on which (is based (see on4D
Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 480 and Mills
( 1981 ) 253 – 6 ). Finally, it appears fromEth. Nic. 1181 a 10 ff. that
and
cannot be
regarded as opposites:( %
!
8
<
(. 1 5 '
1
#
.
(^61) For the"is not3 8 , but !.Cf.Huby( 1979 ) 57 and Dirlmeier ( 1962 a) 491 – 2 ,
contra Verdenius ( 1971 ) 291 n. 14. For the neuter$cf. my note 37.
(^62) See von Fragstein ( 1974 ) 377.