Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

as well as coordinating the dispatch and arrival of the

local power/utility company crew (in the event the tac-

tical commander decides to cut the electrical power in

the subject dwelling). The support negotiators are

responsible for gathering all relevant information

regarding the subjects (e.g., physical description,

clothing, weapons, prescription/nonprescription med-

ications, contact phone numbers, and arrest and psy-

chiatric history). This is done via records checks and

interviewing on-scene family members, friends, and

witnesses. The support negotiators also maintain a

running log of times and relevant events during the

SWAT callout. A final responsibility of the support

negotiators is to interview/debrief any hostages who

are released during a hostage situation. The negotiator

team leader assists the mental health consultant in the

assignment of team responsibilities for the specific

callout as well as providing consultation at the TOC.

The mental health consultant provides assistance to

the negotiator team leader in negotiator assignments,

provides psychological personality assessment, psy-

chotropic consultation, monitors negotiator team

performance and stress reactions, and provides dispo-

sitional consultation to the TOC.

Once the team responsibilities are determined, the

TOC commander, tactical and negotiator team leaders,

and the mental health consultant determine the com-

munication mode by which the primary negotiator will

attempt to make contact with the subject. This decision

is predicated on officer safety first and the type of cri-

sis situation. There are four means by which to com-

municate with the subject: police vehicle public

address (PA) system, parabolic PA, telephone (land-

line, cell phone, throw phone), or voice to voice. If the

situation is a criminal, barricaded subject with no

hostages, then either PA system is typically used for

officer safety as well as the commanding tone of the

PA. For all other situations, it is preferable to use some

form of phone system and optimally establish tactical

presence to support the use of voice to voice (the nego-

tiator and subject are close enough to one another to

communicate by simply speaking in a conversational

tone to one another) for the resolution phase.

The Effects of Time and

the Stockholm Syndrome

Hostage and crisis negotiation is an extremely compli-

cated process incorporating three basic principles.

First is the concept of time, in which, during most crit-

ical events, the extension of time invariably works in

favor of successful resolution. During this so-called

60- to 90-minute rule, the passage of time allows for

the ventilation of extreme emotional responses (for

the subjects, hostages, and police officers). This dissi-

pation of emotion allows for the introduction of more

logical and rational problem solving, the influence of

physiological needs, as well as, in the hostage situa-

tion, the opportunity for the hostages to escape.

However, it should never be assumed that hostages,

if given the opportunity, will proactively initiate an

escape or will assist the SWAT team in the successful

resolution of the crisis. The underlying process, which

is extremely powerful in most hostage situations, has

become known as the Stockholm syndrome. This grad-

ually occurs as a natural process of the passage of time

(typically over hours and days); however, if there is

significant violence at the onset of the taking of

hostages, this syndrome compels an immediate and

powerful influence. This syndrome compels one of the

following behaviors: The hostages will begin to have

positive feelings toward the hostage takers, the hostages

will begin to develop negative feelings toward law

enforcement, and the hostage takers will begin to

develop positive feelings toward their hostages. The

effect of the Stockholm syndrome on the negotiation

process is rather consistent for the hostage takers and

the hostages. The positive dynamic is that as time

elapses, and if the hostage takers have begun to

develop positive feelings toward their hostages, they

are actually less likely to harm, much less kill, their

hostages, whom they now begin to see as humans and

not just objects for barter. However, negative aspects

include the hostages’ inability to self-initiate their

escape, communication by hostages of unreliable

information to the negotiators either on release or dur-

ing captivity, or hostages’ interference with the rescue

operation. In rare cases, if the Stockholm syndrome is

not severe, some hostages have been known to exag-

gerate the motives and weaponry of the hostage takers

to the negotiators, with the intent of having the SWAT

team conclude the hostage takers were more dangerous

than in fact they were, and the tactical team eventually

would feel compelled to initiate an active entry and

perhaps kill the hostage takers.

The Influence of Power

Tactics and Face-Saving

The second component in the negotiation process is

incremental display of power, in the hope of avoiding

its actual use during the negotiation process. A highly

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