44 Europe TheEconomistJanuary8th 2022
centrating onhis work.“Otherwise you
willloseyourselfinthoughtsandnotget
muchdone,”hesays.
Thepuzzleofhowtoprepareforwar
withouttormentingoneselfisa collective
one.InKyiv,streets andmarketsbustle.
Nightlynewschannelsseldomleadwith
worries over war. But preparations are
afoot,andnotalwayssmooth.Inhipperar
easofthecapital,oldairraidsheltersthat
becamefancybarsandcafésmustprepare
tobecomesheltersagain.Athreeminute
testofKyiv’ssirenswasexpectedonDe
cember29thbeforeauthoritiespostponed
it indefinitelythedaybefore.A poorlypre
sentedplan ordering women in certain
usefulprofessionslikeittoregisterwith
thearmedforcessparkedconfusion,inter
netmemesanda viralpetitiondecryingit.
Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s presi
dent,isnotexactlyunitingthecountrybe
hindhim.Pollssuggestthatfewvotersfan
cyhimasa wartimeleader.Thatmayex
plainwhyhistussleswithpoliticalfoes
havenotceased.Thepresidentpredicted
anoligarchledcoupagainsthiminearly
Decemberthatfailedtomaterialise.OnDe
cember20thhispredecessor,PetroPorosh
enko,waschargedwithtreasonoveral
leged payments for coal sourced from
Ukraine’soccupiedterritories.(Hedenies
anywrongdoing.)
Itisnotonly thespectre ofwarthat
haunts Ukraine, but also thatof anew
peacewithnewpolitics.Sinceitsrevolu
tionof 2014 Ukrainehastriedtoreformits
economyandarmedforces,andbuttress
theruleoflaw.Onemotivationhasbeen
thelureofmembershipofnatoandthe
eu, whichaskapplicantstospruceupbe
forejoining. Buta Russianinvasion, or
desperatecompromisestoavertone,could
createaclimateinwhichUkrainiansno
longerbelievetheWesterndreamispossi
ble.Thatmightcausereformtostall.
PoliticiansinUkrainewouldliketofeel
inchargeoftheircountry’sfate.Buttheir
wishtothrowtheirlotinwiththeWesthas
promptedtheKremlintodismissthemas
puppetsunworthyofdirectcommunication.In an articlepublishedin October
DmitryMedvedev,a formerRussianprime
ministerandpresident,offereda preview
of the regime’s negotiation strategy: “It
makesnosenseforustodealwiththevas
sals.Businessmustbedonewiththeover
lord.”RussiaandAmericahaveagreedto
bilateral talks, scheduled for January
9th10th.TherewillbenoUkrainiansin
theroom.
ThatmakesithardforMrZelenskyto
adheretohiscatchphrase:“nothingabout
Ukraine without Ukraine”. His govern
mentclaimstobeuntroubledbythetalks,
and theWesternpowers insistthey are
constantlyconsultingit.ButMrZelensky
mightwellbefeelingthesameimpotence
asMrSergienkoinVovchansk.nDonetskOdessaKyivSevastopolSeaof
AzovUKRAINERUSSIA
CrimeaControlledby
Russian-backed
separatists
Donb
asLuhanskKharkivVovchanskDnie
perBlack
Sea200 kmMoscowEUenergypolicyNein, danke!
T
heendof 2021 broughtmixednewsfor
Germany’s antinuclear crowd. On De
cember 6th the gaggle of activists who had
gathered outside the Brokdorf nuclear
plant, in northern Germany, every month
for the 36 years it had operated swapped
their usual thermoses for champagne. For
on December 31st Brokdorf, the construc
tion of which had inspired some of the
roughest protests in German history, was
one of three nuclear plants switched off for
good. The remaining three will be closed
down by the end of this year, concluding a
nuclear exit two decades in the making.
Then came the downer. Just before mid
night on December 31st, after months of
dithering, the European Commission cir
culated a draft energy “taxonomy” that la
belled natural gas and nuclear fission as
sustainable, with conditions. The taxon
omy, which must be finalised and then ap
proved by the eu’s 27 governments and the
European Parliament, is designed to steer
investment to climatefriendly projects
(see Finance section). But if the aim was to
please everyone by finding room for all but
the dirtiest fuels, it failed in Germany. Rob
ert Habeck, the vicechancellor and co
leader of the Green party, called the draft
“greenwashing”, citing concerns about
safety and nuclear waste. An mpfrom the
Social Democratic Party (spd), which leads
the governing coalition, compared nuclear
supporters (ludicrously) to antivaxxers.
Atomic fission was once the future in
Germany. That was before the emergence,
in the mid1970s, of the world’s most en
during antinuclear movement. Unlike environmental groups in some other coun
tries, says JanHenrik Meyer at the Max
Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal
Theory, Germany’s Greens emerged direct
ly from the antinuclear campaign. Its pre
cepts guided their actions in state parlia
ments as well as the national one, culmi
nating in a decision by an spdGreen co
alition in 2000 to abandon nuclear for
good. In 2010 Angela Merkel partially re
versed that decision. Less than a year later,
amid huge protests in the wake of Japan’s
Fukushima meltdown, she made the big
gest uturn of her career and agreed to turn
off all Germany’s nuclear plants by 2022.
A disaster, say critics. Nuclear power
entails hardly any carbon emissions and
offers consistent baseload supply, unlike
intermittent renewables. If new plants are
pricey and create waste, prematurely de
commissioning old ones seems selfde
feating, especially when bureaucracy and
bottlenecks are slowing the rollout of re
newables. In the short term the burning of
coal and gas may rise to make up the short
fall. And the transition to electric cars and
the need for clean hydrogen will require
yet more electricity, and thus an even more
extensive rollout of renewable sources.
Many Germans deny that scrapping nu
clear has made emissions higher than they
would otherwise have been. Emissions
from power generation have fallen, even as
nuclear plants have closed. Moreover, they
argue, renewables would not have grown
so quickly had nuclear been preserved.
“There was a clear connection between the
exit from nuclear and the entry of renew
ables,” says Simon Müller, Germany direc
tor at Agora Energiewende, a thinktank.
The coalition that sought to halt nuclear
power in 2000 also introduced vast subsi
dies for renewables as part of Germany’s
Energiewende, or energy turnaround. If the
subsidies hurt German consumers, who
have long faced Europe’s dearest electrici
ty, the rest of the world has benefited from
the cheaper photovoltaic cells and wind
turbines they made possible.
But Germany’s Sonderweg (special path)
in energy policy is not to the taste of coun
tries with different histories, politics and
energy mixes. France is placing a big bet on
nuclear; several central European coun
tries see it as a way to wean themselves off
coal. Many resent the fingerwagging tone
in Berlin, especially when Germany is
boosting imports of Russian gas.
Germany is unlikely to try to overturn
the commission’s proposals, which would
require a big majority of eucountries. But
it will not be deflected from its antinuc
lear, progas course: the commission has
no direct say in countries’ energy choices.
As the euworks on laws to realise its ambi
tion to go carbonfree by 2050,andfears of
a winter energy crunch grow,these new
year spats herald bigger rows.nB ERLIN
Why Germans remain so jittery about
nuclear power