152 The Nature of Political Theorystylized collectivized vision of a British war-based post-1945 polity and economy (see
Oakeshott 1975: 269, n.1, 273, 287).^10 This whole argument has strong parallels with
Friedrich Hayek’s critical distinction betweenteleocraticandcatallacticorders (Hayek
1976).
The civil association-basedsocietasstate is also intimately linked, in Oakeshott’s
mind, with the earlier theme of human conduct, that is, the particular ‘ideal character’
of exploring, enacting, and disclosing the self. It is also connected to a concept of
individualism, not the individualism of nineteenth century liberalism, but an older
idea found in the writings of Montaigne, Cervantes, and Pascal. This is an individual
life considered as a personal adventure of self-enactment and disclosure, withno
outside or external moral or political foundations. Thesocietasstate entails that such
individuals are associated, but not joined in any common substantive purpose. The
connective between individuals in this civilsocietasis therefore what Oakeshott refers
to as a ‘watery fidelity’. It is not concerned with affection or mutual concern, rather,
it is a recognition of the authority of a system of laws ‘composed of conditions to
be subscribed to in self-chosen conduct, conditions indifferent to the satisfactions
sought in the actions and utterances they qualify’ (Oakeshott 1975: 263).
Oakeshott’s own political stance is more clearly seen in his earlierRationalism in
Politics, although it underpins his debate onsocietas. In a phrase, it is a philosoph-
ical conservatism.^11 As Oakeshott states, ‘politics is not the science of setting up a
permanently impregnable society, it is the art of knowing where to go next in the
explanation of an already existing traditional kind of society’ (Oakeshott 1962: 58).
This is neither a romantic nostalgia, nor a forward-looking optimism. If anything,
the argument has affinities with Edmund Burke, although in Oakeshott it is a totally
secularized claim and does not sanctify any existing constitution. Oakeshott neither
idolizes the past, nor seeks to prevent all change. Traditional politics is rather the ‘dis-
position’ of one who has a mature grasp of the character of both human understand-
ing and experience.
The crucial distinction, which underpins this dispositional conservatism is between
traditional or practical reason, as against theoretical reason. This distinction, made by
Oakeshott, arises in the context of his subtle discussion of rationalism and traditional-
ism. Political activity, for Oakeshott, is not something that arises from instantaneous
desires or principles. The roots of practice are neither simple motivating desires,
nor a worked out rational belief. Rather, practice is rooted in an existing tradition
of behaviour. A tradition, as mentioned, is a mixture of preferences and aversions,
approvals and disapprovals, anxieties, fears, and beliefs. This does not constitute a
creed or rationally self-consistent doctrine. For Oakeshott: ‘Practical discourse is the
process in which (among other things) we elicit from this “tradition” decisions about
what to do and justifications of acts or proposals to act’ (Oakeshott 1965: 90). Thus,
practical knowledge, whether in riding a bike or legislating, is assimilated gradu-
ally in the ‘doing’ within a tradition. It is not something that can be formulated in
precise rules. It can only be learnt by participating in a tradition. For Oakeshott,
this practical or traditional knowledge is distinct from rationalist theory, ideology,
and technical knowledge. The rationalist technician ‘insists upon getting a straight