Shoring Up Foundations 153answer’ (Oakeshott 1965: 90). She selects, abridges, and abstracts to make a self-
consistent creed, composed of maxims, rules, and precise concepts. A manual on
how to ride a bicycle, or how to cook, is thus equivalent to Lenin’sWhat is to be Done?,
Rawls’Theory of Justice, Brian Barry’sJustice as Impartiality,orHayek’sConstitution
of Liberty. The latter are all technical political ‘cookbooks’, rationalist manuals, which
comprised abstract highly-selective rules. The rationalist cannot abide the ambiguity
of tradition. It is worth noting here that, for Oakeshott, many ‘apparent’ conservatives
appear in this rationalist category.^12
One of the many problems with this line of argument is its intrinsic reflexivity. It is
clear that both practical reason and knowledge are conceptually structured. They are
drawn rationally distinct from theoretical reason. Practical reason provides a coher-
ent principle of interpretation and a prescription for action. Therefore, is Oakeshott’s
view on tradition and practice an abridgement of tradition? We find Oakeshott speak-
ing in clear intelligible terms about something (tradition), which is supposed to be
rationally inchoate. It seems that Oakeshott himself poses the reflexive problem by
acclaiming his own position as virtually an Archimedean standpoint on the nature
of theory and philosophy. What, for example, is the nature of Oakeshott’s linked
distinctions between technical and practical knowledge, rationalism and tradition,
the conservative disposition and ideological thought? Are these distinctions ‘tradi-
tionally situated’ or ‘abridgements of tradition’? In other words, is Oakeshott just a
covert conservative ideologist artfully trading on philosophy?
Leaving this criticism to the side, one important argument that Oakeshott uses
here is, also, in fact, deeply modernist. His idiosyncratic response to the question
of the sources and nature of morality and politics, resonates with aspects of late
twentieth century moral and political theory. For Oakeshott, as noted, morality and
politics are not and never can be universals. There arenoexternal metaphysical
or moral foundations. All that exist are ‘ideal characters’, which relate, in turn, to
specific historical civilizations. In fact, for Oakeshott, history is possibly one of the
most effective ways of studying human conduct. Religion is also read by Oakeshott
as a valuable human resource for both self-enactment and self-disclosure, but, one
which, again,onlyreflects a conventional culture, or, one element of the culture
of a civilized community of believers (see Oakeshott 1975: 83–5). Every religion is
therefore a part of a tradition and traditions are tricky, particularist, and multi-voiced
creatures. In consequence of this conventional account of meaning, all universalist
claims are regarded with deep scepticism. Neither reason nor justice standoutside
human conduct. Nothing provides agents with any universal standards, or a ‘view
form nowhere’. Oakeshott acknowledges, unashamedly, and without any apparent
anxiety, that both morality and politics can be and frequently are deeply corrupt,
misused, and imperfect, and, that there are potentially many versions of morality and
politics. Moral and political pluralism are therefore inevitable. All human conduct is
rooted in the diverse conventions (and the ideal characters) of civilized communities.
What actually constrains moral or political conduct is the postulates that intelli-
gent reflective agents utilize for exploring both their own selves and their relation
with others. These postulates are all contingent—although at the same time we are