New Conventions for Old 189important strands of Anglo-American political culture, of the early modern period,
as part of a civic humanist or civic republican tradition, derived from Renaissance
Italy. Similar themes were developed in the work of Hans Baron, Adrian Oldfield,
and Quentin Skinner (Baron 1966; Oldfield 1990; Skinner 1991, 1998; Pettit 1997;
Brugger 1999; Maynor 2003). Skinner, and more recent writers such as Philip Pet-
tit, have moved away from the historical commentary into direct normative claims
concerning the contemporary relevance of republicanism as an alternative to liberal-
ism (Pettit 1993a, 1997). Skinner is slightly more opaque here. But he certainly uses
republicanism to question ‘liberal hegemony’ in political theory.^12 In other words,
republicanism provides an intellectual resource for contemporary political theory
and practice to counter the hegemony of liberal theory. Republicanism is purported
to embody the third, apparently lost, concept of liberty—in addition to negative and
positive liberty. This is liberty as non-domination.
If we hone in on recent republican writings a little more closely, there are cer-
tain background assumptions, which require further explication. Primarily, there is
the mundane assumption of a community made up of rational independent-minded
citizens. Even contemporary neo-Roman republicans assume that modern pluralist
society will be largely peopled by such agents. Further, there is a supposition of some
form of minimal rational public culture—usually focused on a particular and quite
idiosyncratic reading of liberty, distinct from notions of negative and positive liberty.
Republican laws in this reading, enable citizens. Law socializes and controls natural
selfishness. Liberty is seen to be most likely to be preserved under republican institu-
tions and laws, which facilitate individual self-rule. Strengthening individual liberty
therefore means strengthening republican institutions. Consequently, republicans
emphasize the need for laws to ensure that people act with virtue and within the same
generic framework of values. The rational virtues espoused by the republic are now
secular in character. Modern republicans are though keen to foster homogenization
through civic education and institutional design (see also Maynor 2003, ch. 7).^13
As mentioned, the only caveat to enter here, on the question of republicanism, is a
distinction occasionally drawn between the older stronger as against the more recent
weaker manifestations of republicanism, or, alternatively, neo-Athenian and neo-
Roman republicanism. The older stronger format emphasizes the civic participation
and duty over the mere assertion of civil rights, whereas the weaker seeks the converse.
The stronger civic variant thus entails more cultural and moral uniformity. It places
a powerful emphasis on virtuous active citizens and an integrating and unifying
public good, which should take priority over private goods. The weaker conception,
which prevails in most recent expositions, entails therefore a much more restricted
pragmatic conception of impartiality. It does not demand that individuals share
values, but only that they are prepared to debate their views rationally in a public
setting. This distinction can be found in both proponents of and recent commentators
on republican political theory. Thus, Brugger, for example, focuses on the difference
between Benjamin Barber’s tougher republicanism inStrong Democracy, as against
Pettit’s much weaker form. Pettit, in point, refers to his own version as ‘gas and water’
republicanism—echoing the mild reformist socialism of the British Fabians. Maynor