Dialogic Foundations 275(as I will argue) that both do, at the same time, configure their arguments under the
rubric of a qualified conception of universalism and a more immanent foundational-
ism. Finally, one of the additional claims that characterize both theorists—particularly
Gadamer—is a stress on historical change and contingency. In subtle, but quite def-
inite ways, although we are not determined by our historical situation or indigenous
traditions, our language and our political lives are still deeply affected and shaped by
historical change and contingency.
Critical Theory
In terms of the influences on his first systematic workKnowledge and Human
Interests, Habermas brings into play elements of Marxism and neo-Marxism (spe-
cifically through the critical theory school), classical German Idealism (Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel), hermeneutics (Dilthey and Gadamer), American pragmatism
(G. H. Mead and C. S. Peirce) and Anglo-American analytic/linguistic philosophy
(Wittgenstein, Searle, and Austin), as well as a wide range of social scientific and
psychological theories. Given this eclectic approach, it might seem inappropriate, on
one reading, to characterize him as a critical theorist. Habermas does, in fact, view his
later work as more explicitly neo-Kantian in inspiration. However, neo-Kantianism
and critical (Marxian-inspired) theory arenotnecessarily opposed. In fact, there is
a powerful twentieth-century tradition, particularly in Austria and Germany, which
linked these theoretical perspectives.^3 In addition, the critical theory project marks
out the beginning of Habermas’ work, particularly in his early critical reaction to
figures such as Marx and Heidegger. The initial Marxian inspired ‘emancipatory aim’
of critical theory has remained an underlying motif in all Habermas’s work, even if, by
2000, it acquired a much more ‘liberal’ edge and had become predominantly focused
on working out the complex ramifications of communicative ethics.
One of the most important aspects of Habermas’ perspective derives from his
initial contact with the critical theorists. Habermas became associated with the crit-
ical theory project largely through his contact with Institute for Social Research in the
post-1945 period. Critical theory itself, initially, developed in terms of Marxist dis-
appointment over the absence of revolution in the West, the growth of Stalinism, and
the fascist successes in Germany and elsewhere. Like most of the work of the critical
theory group, Habermas is also deeply sensitive to the specifically German context of
debates about reason. National socialism, and its historical impact, not only condi-
tion his response to Heidegger, Nietzsche, and German conservatism, but also form
side constraints to his theorizing in general. In point, his response to the whole post-
modern tradition is coloured by this underlying theme. As Habermas remarks, with
hindsight, for critical theory writers it appeared that ‘the last sparks of reason were
being extinguished’ during the 1930s and 1940s (see Habermas 1998: 117). Marx-
ism is no longer seen as in any way immanent. This is particularly the case in terms
of the growth of post-1945 affluent societies in the West. Such societies appear in
fact to contradict the logic of Marxist historicism. Critical theory therefore aims to