298 The Nature of Political Theoryintersubjectivity, as manifest in language. In fact, Gadamer suggests that ‘translation’
is the most apt term to describe what happens in virtually all human communication
and dialogue. Dialogue and linguisticality,per se, are regarded as the dominant aspect
of human experience. In this sense, the emphasis shifts in Gadamer away from the
epistemology of the subject (and epistemology in general) towards ontology. Our
being is within our language; as Gadamer remarks, ‘being that can be understood is
language’ (Gadamer 1977: 103). The manner in which this ontological linguisticality
is best dealt with is through hermeneutics, for ‘hermeneutics reaches into all the
contexts that determine and condition the linguisticality of the human experience of
the world’ (Gadamer 1977: 19). Gadamer’s hermeneutics is essentially a move away
from method, a deeper focus on language and dialogue, a concentration of practical
philosophy and a sharper observation of historical consciousness.
In effect, for Gadamer, language (and dialogue) have now replaced thought in
philosophy. As he notes, ‘Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our
being-in-the-world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the world’
(Gadamer 1977: 3). This point is linked to his more well-known comment quoted
above—which gives rise to many misunderstandings—namely that being that can be
understood is language. For Gadamer, this is ‘not a metaphysical assertion. Instead,
it describes, from the medium of understanding, the unrestricted scope possessed by
the hermeneutical perspective’ (Gadamer 1977: 103). Language, as amodus operandi,
requires hermeneutics. However, this is not an abstracted method of hermeneutics.
Writers, such as Humboldt and Herder, had already focused on the crucial role of
language. However, the problem arises, for Gadamer, when one tries to view language
objectively, scientifically, or methodically. Such a science implies a distancing from
the object of study. The real problem with this perspective for Gadamer is that ‘all
thinking about language is already drawn back into language. We can only think in
language, and just this residing of our thinking in a language is a profound enigma that
language presents to thought’. Language is not just a tool or instrument at our disposal.
In Gadamer, language is ontological and not an epistemological issue. It is only in
language that we understand and are at home in the world. Language is, in effect, all
we have. It is not something that mirrors or represents the world, conversely, ‘it is the
living out of what is with us—not only in the concrete interrelationships of world and
politics but in all the other relationships and dependencies that comprise our world’
(see Gadamer 1977: 32).^8 It is neither an anonymous practice, which can be studied
by science, nor something at the mercy of historical processes. Language is thewhole
process itself. Understanding language is not simply an activity of consciousness, it is
‘itself a mode of the event of being’ (Gadamer 1977: 50).
There are a number of constraints on language in the above context. Gadamer
argues, first, that our language is embedded in history, and second, that this ‘sense
of history’ is embedded in tradition and prejudice. Our historical situatedness is not
something to be bypassed for Gadamer. In fact, it isthemajor issue of twentieth
century thought. Taking up Heidegger’s point, Gadamer sees humans as ‘thrown’ in
historical and linguistic terms. In effect, we are all temporal, finite, historically situated
creatures and our language inevitably reflects these factors. There are, therefore,