Circular Foundations 299no timeless metaphysical absolutes, no ultimate universal foundations and no way
of stepping outside our historical finitude. The problem of history, therefore, in
a nutshell, is that we are irremediably historical beings and our language reflects
this; thus, ‘the consciousness that is effected by history has its fulfilment in what
is linguistic’ (Gadamer 1977: 13). Our language, and consequently our very being,
are rooted in history. However, a great deal of historical work is premised on the
false assumption that it possesses some kind of suprahistorical truth, universal norm,
or knowledgeable authority, that is, that it stands outside time, commenting upon
passing events. The problem of history is therefore seen as external to the discipline
itself, to be dealt with by some form of rigorous academic method. The historian
would therefore see her task as transcending the prejudices of her own finite historical
situation. Conversely, for Gadamer, history is at work in all human language and
consciousness. We cannot avoid, or step outside, our prejudices or our traditions.
However, the inevitable historical character of both language and knowing, is not
a harmful restriction. Philosophical hermeneutics rests on its own finiteness and
historicity. Historical awareness is no inhibition, rather it is central to the practice
of hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle. The past, in such a scenario, becomes,
as such, aninfiniterange of probabilities. Gadamer’s own sense of what it is to be
historically ‘thrown’ is revealed in a number of central concepts. As indicated, his
own version of Heidegger’s fore-structure is implicit within his concepts of prejudice,
tradition, and authority. Basically, every interpretation draws on the anticipations of
the understanding. For Gadamer, these anticipations are part of what he calls our
prejudices. For Gadamer, it is therefore ‘our prejudices that constitute our being’. He
admits that this could sound ‘a provocative formulation’. However, he contends that
he is restoring prejudice to ‘its rightful place as a positive concept’. He suggests that
this positive idea of prejudice ‘was driven out of our linguistic usage by the French
and the English Enlightenment’. For Gadamer, however, ‘Prejudices are not neces-
sarily unjustified and erroneous’, they do not necessarily ‘distort the truth’. In fact,
for Gadamer, ‘the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal
sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experi-
ence. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions
whereby we experience something’ (see Gadamer 1977: 9). Prejudices are therefore
the pre-judgements, anticipations, or fore-structures, which give actual substance to
human experience. They also constitute what we regard as authoritative. Gadamer
is insistent here that all human organizations contain some form of authority. But
to be an authority also requires recognition. Authority is not therefore the same as
coercion or force. Tradition and authority are not simply to be considered as dog-
matically opposed to reason. Reason and traditional authority are not necessarily
at odds. As he comments, ‘I cannot accept the assertion that reason and authority
are abstract antitheses, as the emancipatory Enlightenment did. Rather, I assert that
they stand in a basically ambivalent relation’ (Gadamer 1977: 34). In fact, the anti-
thesis of reason and prejudice, embraced by the Enlightenment, ‘is a mistake fraught
with ominous consequences. In it, reflection is granted a false power’ (Gadamer
1977: 33).^9