The Nature of Political Theory

310 The Nature of Political Theory

one which facilitated and encouraged wide-ranging open discussion. The democratic
and pluralistic implications of this position are obvious.

A Dialogic Conflict

As stressed already, there are clearly a number of important areas of agreement
between Habermas and Gadamer. Both see communication and dialogue as repla-
cing philosophies of thought and consciousness—or, at least,languageto Gadamer
anddiscourseto the later Habermas. Language is, thus, a ‘pragmatic universal’ for
both. They both also reject the philosophy of the subject. Their focus on language
is on intersubjectivity, which constitutes the bulk of human existence and activity in
the world. Given this intersubjectivity, language, texts, and the like, always exceed
speakers and authors. Meaning is rooted in sedimented intersubjective traditions.
Thus, texts, language and discourse are open to manifold interpretations. There is a
rejection in both thinkers of the more classical claims of foundational metaphysics.
Further, they are both agreed that our awareness of the historicity of language and our
sociality is crucial. In addition, they concur that dialogue or discourse are the means
for the resolution of ethical and political questions. The grounds for this resolution
are seen as internal to language or discourse. They are philosophically retrievable and
justifiable. Both thinkers are also critical of the hegemony of the positivistic account
in the social sciences. They therefore object to the takeover or ‘colonization’ of the
lifeworld by the methods of the natural sciences, or any other form of ‘objectivism’.
Every interpreter is already situated within a particular cultural, social, and histor-
ical context. In this sense, both Habermas and Gadamer oppose, to a degree, truth
to method. History and the mutability of language and discourse are incompatible
with the absolutist and foundational claims of natural science methods. Habermas
does, though, have his own strong reservations to make on this point. Further, both
thinkers agree that to partake fully in a language and discourse is to have a full self-
understanding and awareness of ‘what’ one is doing or saying. In this sense, a basic
hermeneutic sense is crucial for any communication.
In the above senses, it can be seen that there is a great deal of common ground
between both thinkers. Thus, in hisOn the Logic of the Social Sciences, Habermas
enrols Gadamer as a definite intellectual collaborator. There is also one further area
of agreement here worth remarking on. Both share a critical view of Wittgenstein.
They agree with Wittgenstein on the importance of language and that it is learned
experientially. However, Habermas and Gadamer are concerned, unlike Wittgenstein,
to stress the point that we have the means to transcend particular languages—in terms
of a unity of reason. With Wittgenstein, however, we are lost to particular language
games or conventions. There is no arch-game. Games are isolated—the only linkage
being the vaguery of ‘family resemblances’. In this sense, one can see clearly why so
many postmodernists, such as Lyotard, Connolly, or Rorty, deeply appreciate the
work of the late Wittgenstein. Yet, for Habermas and Gadamer, wecantranslate
between language games or discourses; we can fuse the horizons of distinct games.