Circular Foundations 311Further, for both the latter theorists, there is a self-reflectivity within language use
and an ability to examine (through the hermeneutic circle and the play of dialogue
in Gadamer), one’s own preconditions and assumptions. Both are also agreed in
seeing Wittgenstein caught in a far more deterministic, quasi-positivistic format,
where competent speakers simply master and reproduce the rules and techniques of
discourse (see Habermas 1996b: 144–5).^23 Wittgenstein therefore fails to question
the structures and preconceptions of language use itself. As Habermas comments,
‘In grammatical rules Gadamer sees not only institutionalized forms of life but also
delimitation of horizons. Horizons are open, and they shift; we wander into them and
they in turn move with us...The lifeworlds established by the grammar of language
games are not closed life forms, as Wittgenstein’s monadological conception suggests’
(Habermas 1996b: 147). Speaking a language adequately therefore is not the same
as the hermeneutic reflexivity of language.^24 The latter involves a deep reflexivity
concerning one’s language use and preconceptions. Further, learning a language, for
HabermasandGadamer, isnotjustamatterofbeingpassivelysocializedorassimilated
into a practice or form of life. It is more an active dialogic, reflective, dynamic process
of continuously translating and trading preconceptions or prejudices within a dialogic
frame. For Gadamer, particularly, unlike Wittgenstein, prejudices also play a crucial
role in human understanding. There are though no original or completely correct
meanings of words, however, multiple meanings remain possible for us. All can
potentially be fused with.
Habermas therefore sees ontological hermeneutics as a definite philosophical
improvement on Wittgensteinian theory. First, it deals with the pluralism of pers-
pectives by avoiding the path of linguistic description and determinism. As Habermas
comments, hermeneutics ‘does not preserve the unity of reason in the pluralism of
languages by means of a metatheory of ordinary language grammars, as the pro-
gram of general linguistics claims to do’. Conversely, for Habermas, it exploits the
self-transcendent power, which is already implicit in all language use, thus, ‘only
by destroying the particularities oflanguage, which are the only way in which it is
embodied, does reason live inlanguage’ (Habermas 1996b: 144). There is no problem
therefore with an external or objective context.^25 The interpreter already belongs to
the objective context in terms of tradition. Second, hermeneutics is premised on the
idea that conversing entails participants interpreting one another. The simple tech-
nical application of a rule misses this point. Third, all language spheres are porous
and historical. They are subject to change and mutation through dialogue and inter-
pretation of traditions (Habermas 1996b: 149). There is no perfect world of rules
within ordinary language. Fourth, hermeneutics is premised on the circular charac-
ter of interpretation, it moves back upon itself continuously. Wittgensteinian theory
does not do this, consequently, it cannot even explain itsownlanguage game. It has
no grasp of the hermeneutic circle (Habermas 1996b: 152–3). Hermeneutics demon-
strates that ‘understanding is necessarily related, on the transcendental level, to the
articulation of an action-orientating self-understanding’ (Habermas 1996b: 162).
However, Habermas, despite his sympathy with Gadamer’s hermeneutics, does
have a number of fundamental objections. To understand the basic points that