The Nature of Political Theory

We Have a Firm Foundation 73

For Freeden, ideologies do contain an odd mixture of emotion and reason
and occasionally some flawed rationality. However, he adds that even the most
rationalistic political philosophical philosophies contain non- or un-rationalized
components (Freeden 1996: 30–1). This is not only a problem for ideology. Further,
an over-emphasis on synchronic abstracted reason and logic can lead to a virtually
semi-private professional academic language, which bears little or no relation to polit-
ics, as perceived and used by the mass of ordinary citizens. In addition, ideologies
are neither strictly true nor false. In what sense, for example, would liberalism or
socialism be true? This conclusion obviously leads to a degree of relativism, which
Freeden considers inevitable. Yet, as he adds, ‘the decline of the status of “truth” in
the social sciences has combined with the realization that the older abstractions and
model-building of political theory cannot satisfy the critical exploration of concrete
idea-phenomena. The more political philosophers attempt to engage in their perfec-
tionist enterprise, the more remote from the sphere of politics,...do their findings
become’ (Freeden 1996: 131). Finally, one also has to acknowledge that despite the
more dominant Anglo-American role of analytic philosophy, that philosophy itself
during the twentieth century has also been polysemic and contested. This adds a new
dimension of complexity to the relation to ideology.
Freeden’s general conclusion is therefore that we should not treat political philo-
sophy and ideology as ‘entirely discrete categories’, but they are alsonotsynonymous.
Each has distinct roles. However, political theory (as a general overarching concept)
should notjustbe limited to clarification of meaning. Ideology is not though imper-
fect political theory. Political theory, in effect, needs a new ecumenical approach,
which incorporates ideology as an equally valid process with political philosophy.

Conclusion

Despite the above arguments, the more dominant position in political theory
throughout the second half of the twentieth century has clearly been thenegative
segregationthesis. The basic contention of this latter thesis is that a belief in liberal-
ism, rights, freedom or justice, and the like, is not just a matter of allegiance or having
a cognitive ideological map. It is rather something we believe in withgood justific-
atory reason. A justification, qua normative or analytical theory, therefore involves
citing good arguments and valid reasons. It is not simply about being persuaded or
converted. Justifying is not like becoming a fan of a football team. Justifying is tied to
critical reasoning about what is fundamental to us. It follows that there can be good
and bad, or true and false reasons. To suggest the contrary (qua ideology) that there
cannot be true or false reasons or beliefs, would be asserting an absolute truth, which
is a performative contradiction in, for example, Freeden’s argument. Proponents
of thenegative segregationthesis thus suggest that ideologies are always irrational,
cultural, and emotive assertions, which should always be kept distinct from genuine
justificatory normative political theory.