The Nature of Political Theory

74 The Nature of Political Theory

However, given the totality of the discussion in Part One, it is difficult to know
precisely whatgenuinepolitical theory really is. Further, the justificatory-based argu-
ment equally cannot assert that reasons can be good or bad or true or false. The
claim is that good reasons must be asserted to justify a belief; yet what would be the
‘good reason’ for asserting that there must be good reasons for asserting beliefs—
ad nauseam? In other words the justificatory reason argument is, itself, logically
premised on a questionable metaphysical supposition. The critic is trying, in one
sense, to ‘convert’ her audience to a ‘justificatory reasons’ position. However, what
would be theindependenttrue reason for affirming the belief that there are true and
false reasons? What counts as a good reason for many religious believers, or multiple
other human practices, is clearlynota good reason for non-believers. What some
consider to be good critical philosophy, others consider to be uncritical nonsense. In
other words, there is an underlying hubris, simple-mindedness and dogmatism in
the justificatory reason argument, which makes it incapable of any philosophical self-
reflexivity. In addition, there is little or no awareness concerning exactly how political
philosophy has been practised in the twentieth century. It certainly has not—even
with the Anglo-American fold—been solely focused on the ‘normative justificatory
reasons’ perspective. To think otherwise takes intellectual myopia to a high art form.
This negative appraisal could be pursued much farther; however, what is surely a
much more reasonable path is that we should consider seriously something like the
positive segregationthesis. This is not an argument which denies the distinctive roles of
normative justification, ideology, or history. However, ideology is seen to be as serious
and equally valid a mode of study as (what is very loosely called) political philosophy.
This theoretical ecumenism looks a much more hopeful way forward. This latter
thesis also gels with the far broader ecumenical thesis, concerning the nature of
political theory, outlined within Part One, which has, in effect, analysed certain
dominant perceptions of the political theory during the twentieth century, at a broad
level of generality. The five positions outlined were: classical normative, institutional,
historical, empirical, and ideological political theory. As suggested, some of these
components have more obvious contextual references. It is, for example, a matter of
fact that the first real attempts to do political theory, as a disciplinary practice, figured
in the institutional and historical state-based theory context. This latter theme has
now largely dropped into the background. Other components discussed have a much
more current status. It is important though to underscore the point, again, that the
categories discussed are not self-enclosed forms of theorizing; conversely, there are
complex overlaps between them. The conclusion is that there isnopristine essence
to political theory. Political theory is and always has been an uneasy combination of
different modes of thought.

Notes

1. The systematic account of normative political theory will be postponed until Part Two and
   later chapters.