APPENDIX
of fact, than of fictions. Why then look any far-
ther, or multiply suppositions without neces-
sity?
Thirdly, We can explain the causes of the firm
conception, but not those of any separate im-
pression. And not only so, but the causes of the
firm conception exhaust the whole subject, and
nothing is left to produce any other effect. An
inference concerning a matter of fact is noth-
ing but the idea of an object, that is frequently
conjoined, or is associated with a present im-
pression. This is the whole of it. Every part
is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more
steady conception; and nothing remains capa-
ble of producing any distinct impression.
Fourthly, The effects of belief, in influenc-
ing the passions and imagination, can all be
explained from the firm conception; and there