APPENDIX
is no occasion to have recourse to any other
principle. These arguments, with many oth-
ers, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, suf-
ficiently prove, that belief only modifies the
idea or conception; and renders it different to
the feeling, without producing any distinct im-
pression. Thus upon a general view of the sub-
ject, there appear to be two questions of impor-
tance, which we may venture to recommend
to the consideration of philosophers, Whether
there be any thing to distinguish belief from the
simple conception beside the feeling of senti-
ment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing
but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that
we take of the object?
If, upon impartial enquiry, the same conclu-
sion, that I have formed, be assented to by
philosophers, the next business is to examine