BOOK I PART III
at the same time is undetermined in its choice
of any particular event.
Proceeding then in that reasoning, wherein
we have advanced three steps; that chance is
merely the negation of a cause, and produces
a total indifference in the mind; that one nega-
tion of a cause and one total indifference can
never be superior or inferior to another; and
that there must always be a mixture of causes
among the chances, in order to be the foun-
dation of any reasoning: We are next to con-
sider what effect a superior combination of
chances can have upon the mind, and after
what manner it influences our judgment and
opinion. Here we may repeat all the same argu-
ments we employed in examining that belief,
which arises from causes; and may prove, af-
ter the same manner, that a superior number of