BOOK I PART III
chances produces our assent neither by demon-
stration nor probability. It is indeed evident
that we can never by the comparison of mere
ideas make any discovery, which can be of con-
sequence in this affairs and that it is impossi-
ble to prove with certainty, that any event must
fall on that side where there is a superior num-
ber of chances. To, suppose in this case any
certainty, were to overthrow what we have es-
tablished concerning the opposition of chances,
and their perfect equality and indifference.
Should it be said, that though in an oppo-
sition of chances it is impossible to determine
with certainty, on which side the event will fall,
yet we can pronounce with certainty, that it is
more likely and probable, it will be on that side
where there is a superior number of chances,
than where there is an inferior: should this be