BOOK I PART IV
Nothing is more certain from experience,
than that any contradiction either to the sen-
timents or passions gives a sensible uneasi-
ness, whether it proceeds from without or from
within; from the opposition of external ob-
jects, or from the combat of internal principles.
On the contrary, whatever strikes in with the
natural propensities, and either externally for-
wards their satisfaction, or internally concurs
with their movements, is sure to give a sen-
sible pleasure. Now there being here an op-
position betwixt the notion of the identity of
resembling perceptions, and the interruption
of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy
in that situation, and will naturally seek re-
lief from the uneasiness. Since the uneasiness
arises from the opposition of two contrary prin-
ciples, it must look for relief by sacrificing the
one to the other. But as the smooth passage of