BOOK I PART IV
our thought along our resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can
never without reluctance yield up that opinion.
We must, therefore, turn to the other side, and
suppose that our perceptions are no longer in-
terrupted, but preserve a continued as well as
an invariable existence, and are by that means
entirely the same. But here the interruptions in
the appearance of these perceptions are so long
and frequent, that it is impossible to overlook
them; and as the appearance of a perception in
the mind and its existence seem at first sight
entirely the same, it may be doubted, whether
we can ever assent to so palpable a contradic-
tion, and suppose a perception to exist with-
out being present to the mind. In order to clear
up this matter, and learn how the interruption
in the appearance of a perception implies not
necessarily an interruption in its existence, it