ȂȂȁ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophyhobbyists with their particular concerns. Like most people, he wants to
think well of himself; he wants to think he is accomplishing something.
His particular mission in life is to perceive problems and get government
programs enacted to solve them.ȀȄEven when out of office, the politician
does not typically strive to limit the scope for doing good in the office
he hopes to win at the next election.ȀȅIn office, he wants to carry forth
his uncompleted programs and continue serving the public better than his
opponents could do.
Publicity is helpful in the quest for votes. (So is having patronage with
which to reward supporters, and to which government expansion con-
tributes.) One way to gain favorable publicity is to become identified with
one or more problems and with proposals for their solution—pollution,
unemployment, the urban crisis, the energy crisis, the expenses of medi-
cal care, poverty, inequality, or whatever. It may even count as a solution
that the proposed legislation merely creates a new agency assigned to deal
with the problem.ȀȆOne reason for delegating work to regulatory agencies
is that the legislature has too much to do to consider problems and solu-
tions in detail; legislating, along with the bargaining necessary for it, is
a high-cost activity with steeply rising marginal costs (PosnerȀȈȆȃ). Fur-
thermore, the vagueness inherent in handling a problem by turning it over
to a new agency can itself be helpful in lulling possible opposition, just as
vagueness in the wording of a proposed international agreement may be
helpful in getting all parties to accept it.
Ļe individual advocate of one particular bit of government expansion
has little personal incentive to consider the external diseconomies that
may result in the form of the enhanced role of inadequately supervised
experts and the worsened difficulties of monitoring government. Neither
he nor the voters will recognize any responsibility of his for such long-
run consequences. Later on, after such pseudosolutions have enhanced
the power of administrators, reduced the relative power of the people and
ȀȄ“[T]he people’s representatives seem to be enchanted with the notion that they are
not doing their job unless they are manufacturing laws” (McClellanȀȈȆȃ, p.ȅȅ).
ȀȅSee Benjamin Constant,Cours de Politique Constitutionnelle(ȀȇȀȇ–Ȁȇȁǿ), as quoted in
Bertrand de JouvenelȀȈȃȈ, p.Ȃȇȃ; and also de Jouvenel himself, p.Ȁǿ.
ȀȆRelevant here is Amitai EtzioniȀȈȆȁ, pp.ȇȇ–Ȉȁ,Ȁȃȁ–ȀȃȂ. Headed “Got a problem ...?
... call or write Ļe Grand Shaman,” the article notes people’s propensity to look to the
federal government for solutions to all sorts of problems. Its main concern, however, is the
empty, symbolic character of many ostensible solutions. Speeches are made, conferences
held, commissions appointed, bills passed, agencies established, funds appropriated, and
programs launched, often doing little of substance to treat the problems involved.