Chapter dzǹ: Is Ļere a Bias Toward Overregulation? ȂȂȂtheir elected representatives, increased the difficulties of monitoring the
government, and expanded the scope for court cases, these unintended
results will hardly be traced to and blamed on the original sponsors of the
legislation. Meanwhile, they get credit for beingconcernedwith problems.
Politicians and government officials tend to have short time horizons.
Unlike corporation executives, who may hold stock or stock options of
their companies and whose performance tends to be assessed and reported
on the stock market anyway, government officials hold no shares of stock
whose current prices might reflect assessments of thelong-runconse-
quences of their actions; hence, short-run electoral concerns tend to pre-
vail. How much incentive, for example, do mayors have to mount strong
resistance to the demands of unionized city employees? Mayor John Lind-
say of New York “took the attitude that he would not be around in ten
years. He thought he would be either in the White House or doing some-
thing else, so he decided to pay people off with promises of pensions that
would come due when he was no longer mayor” (BorkȀȈȆȇ, p.ȀȂ).
Ļe personal qualities useful in gaining favorable publicity and in polit-
ical wheeling and dealing are not likely to coincide with the personal
qualities of a competent, far-sighted, and courageous statesman. Neither
are the qualities of a successful campaigner, which include adroitness in
projecting an appealing personality and in cleverly stating or obscuring
issues.ȀȇSimilarly, a competent and devoted public servant would have
rather different qualities than a personally successful bureaucrat, whose
abilities might run more toward cultivating superiors by promoting their
personal ambitions.
Exceptions do occur. Why can’t a politician see it as his mission in life
to do good by resisting and reversing the trend toward ever more govern-
ment? If that resistance really is in the interest of the average citizen, why
ȀȇSee EllulȀȈȅȆ, pp.ȀȄǿ–ȀȄȀ: “Ļe politician is generally not competent with regard to
the problems that are his to solve, particularly if, as it is now inevitable, he has become
a specialist in political affairs.... Ļe political leader must be a politician by trade, which
means to be a clever technician in the capture and defense of positions.... desire for power
clearly has priority ... because he cannot undertake just and desirable reforms or guard the
common good unless hefirstobtains power and keeps it.... Ļe two forms of politics ...
demand radically different personal qualities and contrary preoccupations. To be a clever
maneuverer in arriving at the summit is no qualification for perceiving the common good,
making decisions, being politically enlightened, or mastering economic problems. Con-
versely, to have the moral qualities and intellectual competence to be capable of genuine
thought and of eventually putting a genuine political program into operation in no way
ensures having the equipment to reach the top.”