The Economist January 22nd 2022 Leaders 11
T
he first world warbecameinevitableoncemobilisation
orders had been issued in Berlin, argued A.J.P. Taylor, a Brit
ish historian. The complexities of early20thcentury railway
timetables, upon which troop movements then depended, made
any alteration virtually impossible. Modern armies do not suffer
the same constraints. But as Russia sends more and more units
to Ukraine’s borders, a grim momentum is building.
Last week’s diplomacy yielded nothing. Some of Vladimir Pu
tin’s demands are impossible for natoto accept, as he well
knew. (Essentially, he wants natonever to admit new members,
and to remove its forces from any country Russia threatens.) On
January 19th President Joe Biden said that he expects Russia to
“move in” on Ukraine (see Europe section).
On January 14th hackers sabotaged Ukrai
nian government websites, getting them to dis
play a poster of the Ukrainian flag and map
crossed out, and warning Ukrainians to “be
afraid and expect worse”. Over 100,000 Russian
troops are massed on Ukraine’s eastern border,
with field hospitals and fuel dumps. “Battalion
tactical groups” have arrived in Belarus, a
Kremlin client state north of Ukraine, in apparent preparation
for a twofront attack that would divide Ukrainian forces and
menace the capital, Kyiv. Only a trigger is lacking, and America
says it has evidence that a “false flag” operation is planned to al
low Russia to claim its men had been attacked by Ukraine. The
odds of war seem perilously high.
Yet it is not inevitable. The view from a satellite looking down
on Russia’s tanks and guns is certainly alarming; the view pre
sented to Russians on their television screens is anything but.
The possibility of war is barely mentioned. This matters, be
cause if Mr Putin is determined to invade Ukraine again, you
would expect him to prepare the Russian public with a blaze of
propaganda,ashedidbeforeannexingCrimea in 2014. That he
has not suggests, perhaps, that he has yet to make up his mind.
No one knows how Mr Putin assesses the risks and possible
rewards of making war. But here are some things he should con
sider. First, if he invades Ukraine, it will hurt Russia economi
cally. America and the euhave prepared a long list of financial
and trade sanctions. Russian living standards will fall further,
despite the government’s hefty reserves to cushion the blow.
Second, Ukraine’s forces are more than capable of giving Mr
Putin a bloody nose. They cannot stop Russia’s vastly superior
forces from seizing a large portion of their territory, but they can
make it a nightmare to hold it. Third, there is no support in Rus
sia for a deadly war in Ukraine. For years, poll
sters have found that most Russians prefer that
their country and Ukraine would be friendly
neighbours. Mr Putin’s popularity rating has
been declining, like the rouble. A quixotic quest
to restore the Russian empire will not revive it,
especially if lots of Russians are killed. Even au
tocrats have to worry about the public turning
against them. (Not to mention the elite, whose
lives could be made uncomfortable by more sanctions.) A war
that goes wrong could cost Mr Putin his grip on power—and all
that goes with it. It would be a reckless gamble.
The West has no foolproof way to deter him from taking it.
But it should try. America’s secretary of state is due to meet his
Russian counterparton January 21st. He should offer to continue
talks on topics where agreement is possible, such as missile de
ployments and limits on military exercises. He should rally the
euand natoto present a united front against Russian aggres
sion. And he should search for a facesaving way for Mr Putin to
back down (while no doubt claiming victory on Russiannews
bulletins). War can yet be avoided, but time is running out.n
Vladimir Putin is courting disaster for Russia’s neighbour—and himself
Momentum is building for war
Russia and Ukraine
N
ot longago China stood out for its economic resilience in
the face of the pandemic. Today it is a $17.7trn source of vul
nerability in the world economy. A sharp slowdown in its most
important sector, property, caused in part by a clampdown on fi
nancial excess, threatens growth. So does its zerotolerance ap
proach to covid19, which requires doing whatever it takes to ex
tinguish outbreaks. The spread of the Omicron variant, which
was reported in Beijing for the first time on January 15th, makes
that strategy ever harder and costlier to sustain.
Neither property woes nor the pandemic stopped the econ
omy growing by more than 8% in 2021, according to official fig
ures released this week (see Finance & economics section). Ex
ports boomed as richworld consumers, encouraged by stimu
lus, binged on goods. In dollar terms gdpexceeded even pre
pandemic forecasts, thanks to a stronger yuan. Yet China cannot
repeat the trick in 2022; it must confront its problems.
So far it is getting the macroeconomic policy response broad
ly right. A tough set of policies designed to clamp down on dan
gerous property excesses has been moderated, to avoid inadver
tently causing a crisis. Its strict limits on borrowing pushed
overextended developers—most notably Evergrande—into de
fault. This spread unease among homebuyers, who worried that
flats they had bought in advance might never be built. Recently,
the government’s rhetoric has become less hawkish, mortgages
have become slightly cheaper and some cities have made it easi
er to purchase homes.
Today’s policies on property and the pandemic are becoming harder for China to sustain
From hero to zero
China’s economy