Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
42Extract 2: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals (1785).
Taken from: Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by
Allen W Wood (Y ale Universit y Press edit ion, 2002), Text, second section,
pp 29–47.
Every thing in nature works in ac c ordanc e with laws. Only a rational being has
the faculty to act in ac c ordanc e with the representation of laws, i.e., in accordance
wit h princ iples, or a will. Sinc e for t he derivat ion of ac t ions from laws reason is
required, the will is nothing other than prac tic al reason. If reason determines the
will without exc eption, then the ac tions of suc h a being, whic h are rec ognized as
objec t ively nec essary, are also subjec t ively nec essary, i.e., t he will is a fac ult y of
c hoosing only that whic h reason, independently of inc lination, rec ognizes as
prac t ic ally nec essary, i.e., as good. But if reason for it self alone does not
suffic ient ly det ermine t he will, if t he will is st ill subjec t t o subjec t ive c ondit ions (t o
c ertain inc entives) whic h do not always agree with the objec tive c onditions, in a
word, if t he will is not in it self fully in ac c ord wit h reason (as it act ually is wit h
human beings), then the ac tions whic h are objec tively rec ognized as nec essary are
subjec tively c ontingent, and the determination of suc h a will, in ac c ord with
objec t ive laws, is nec essit at ion, i.e., t he relat ion of objec t ive laws t o a will whic h is
not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational
being through grounds of reason to whic h, however, this will in ac c ordanc e with its
nature is not nec essarily obedient.
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is nec essit at ing for a
will, is c alled a ‘c ommand’ (of reason), and t he formula of t he c ommand is c alled an
imperative.
All imperatives are expressed through an ought and thereby indic ate the
relation of an objective law of reason to a will whic h in it s subjec t ive c onst it ut ion is
not nec essarily determined by that law (a nec essitation). They say that it would be
good to do or refrain from something, but they say it to a will that does not always
do something just because it is represented to it as good to do. Practical good,
however, is that which determines the will by means of representations of reason,
henc e not from subjec tive c auses, but objec tively, i.e., from grounds that are valid
for every rat ional being as suc h. It is dist inguished f ro m t h e agreeable, as that
whic h has influenc e on the will only by means of sensation from merely subjec tive
c auses, those whic h are valid only for the senses of this or that one, and not as a
princ iple of reason, whic h is valid for everyone.