Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
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A perfectly good will would thus stand just as muc h under objec tive laws (of
the good), but it would not be possible to represent it as necessitated by them to
lawful ac t ions, bec ause of it self, in ac c ordanc e wit h it s subjec t ive c onst it ut ion, it
can be determined only through the representation of the good. Henc e for the
divine will, and in general for a holy will, no imperat ives are valid; t he ought is out
of plac e here, because the volit ion is of it self already nec essarily in harmony wit h
the law. Hence imperatives are only formulas expressing the relation of objective
laws of volit ion in general t o t he subjec t ive imperfec t ion of t he will of t his or t hat
rational being, e.g., to the human being.
Now all imperat ives c o mma n d e it h e r hypot het ic ally or c at egoric ally. The
former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain
somet hing else whic h one wills (or whic h it is possible t hat one might will). T he
categorical imperative would be that one which represented an action as objectively
necessary for itself, without any referenc e to another end.
...
Finally, there is one imperative that, without being grounded on any other aim
to be ac hieved through a c ertain c ourse of c onduc t as its c ondition, c ommands this
c onduc t immed iat ely. T his imperat ive is categorical. It has to do not with the
matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and the
princ iple from whic h it result s; and what is essent ially good about it c onsist s in t he
disposit ion, what ever t he result may be. T his imperative may be called that of
morality.
...T hus we will have t o invest igat e t he possibilit y of a c at egoric al imperat ive
ent irely a priori, sinc e here we c annot have the advantage that its reality is given in
experienc e, so t hat it s possibilit y would be necessary not for its establishment but
only for it s explanat ion. Meanwhile, we c an provisionally have insight int o t his
much: that the categorical imperative alone can be stated as a practical law, while
the others collectively are, to be sure, princ iples of t he will, but c annot be c alled
‘laws’; for what it is necessary to do for the attainment of a discretionary aim can
be considered in itself to be contingent, and we can always be rid of the precept if
we give up the aim; whereas the unc onditioned c ommand leaves the will no free
disc ret ion in regard t o t he opposit e, henc e it alone c arries wit h it t hat nec essit y
whic h we demand for a law.
If I think of a hypothetic al imperative in general, then I do not know
beforehand what it will c ontain until the c ondition is given t o me. But if I t hink of a
categorical imperat ive, t hen I know direc t ly what it c ont ains. For sinc e besides t he
law, the imperative c ontains only the nec essity of the maxim, that it should ac c ord
with this law, but the law c ontains no c ondition t o whic h it is limit ed, t here remains
nothing left over with whic h the maxim of the ac tion is to be in ac c ord, and this
accordance alone is what the imperative really represents necessarily.
T he c at egoric al imperat ive is t hus only a single one, and specific ally t his: Ac t
only in ac c ordanc e with that maxim through whic h you c an at the same time will
t hat it bec ome a universal law.
...