Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
44Bec ause the universality of the law in ac c ordanc e with whic h effec ts happen
c onst it ut es t hat whic h is really c alled nature in the most general sense (in
ac c ordanc e wit h it s form), i.e., t he exist enc e of t hings insofar as it is det ermined in
ac c ordanc e with universal laws, thus the universal imperative of duty c an also be
stated as follows: So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through
your will a universal law of nature.
...
Now I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exist s as
end in it self, not merely as means t o t he disc ret ionary use of t his or t hat will, but in
all it s ac t ions, t hose directed toward itself as well as those directed toward other
rat ional beings, it must always at the same time be considered as an end. All
objec ts of inc linations have only a c onditioned worth; for if the inc linations and the
needs grounded on them did not exist, then their objec t would be without worth.
The inclinations themselves, however, as sources of needs, are so little of absolute
worth, to be wished for in themselves, that rather to be entirely free of them must
be the universal wish of every rational being. Thus the worth of all objec ts to be
ac quired through our ac tion is always c onditioned. The beings whose existenc e
rests not on our will but on nature nevertheless have, if they are beings without
reason, only a relative worth as means, and are called things; rat ional beings, by
contrast, are called persons, bec ause their nature already marks them out as ends
in themselves, i.e., as something that may not be used merely as means, hence to
t hat ext ent limit s all arbit rary c hoic e (and is an objec t of respect). These are not
merely subjective ends whose existence as effect of our action has a worth for us;
but rat her objec t ive ends, i.e., things whose existenc e in itself is an end, and
spec ific ally an end suc h that no other end c an be set in plac e of it, to which it
should do servic e merely as means, bec ause without this nothing at all of absolut e
worth would be enc ountered anywhere; but if all worth were c onditioned, henc e
c ontingent, then for reason no supreme prac tic al princ iple c ould anywhere be
encountered.
If, then, there is supposed to be a supreme practical principle, and in regard to
the human will a c ategoric al imperative, then it must be suc h from the
representation of that which, being necessarily an end for everyone, because it is
an end in it self, c onstitutes an objec t ive princ iple of t he will, henc e c an serve as a
universal prac t ic al law. T he ground of t his princ iple is: Rational nature exists as end
in it self. The human being nec essarily represents his own existenc e in this way;
thus to that extent it is a subjec t ive princ iple of human ac tions. But every other
rational being also represents his existenc e in this way as c onsequent on the same
rat ional ground as is valid for me; t hus it is at t he same t ime an objec t ive princ iple,
from whic h, as a supreme prac t ic al ground, all laws of t he will must be able t o be
derived.
T he prac t ic al imperat ive will t hus be t he following: Ac t so t hat you use
humanity, as muc h in your own person as in the person of every other, always at
the same time as end and never merely as means. We will see whether this can be
ac c omplished.