Conflict and Coffe in Burundi 113conflict between the governing elite and the general population, and, sec-
ondly, the violent conflict between Hutu and ntsi - we must ask which
kinds of conflict resolution initiatives address which conflict. The official
'peace processes', both domestic and international, tend to address the latter
conflict between the Tutsi government and Hutu rebels. They may take the
issues of political and resource exclusion more or less into account. While it
is certainly necessary to come to an agreement that will end the violence
between these two groups, the first conflict must not be relegated to a sub-
category of this violent conflict, that is something to be addressed once the
political stalemate between elite and fighting groups on both sides has been
overcome. It must be responded to in its own right. In addition to being the
sole basis for a sustainable peace, moves toward greater 'structural peace'
may also help to resolve the political stalemate, and must be supported in
parallel to and even before a formal negotiated peace. Some non-govern-
mental and 'third-track' peace initiatives, domestic and international, are
working in this direction.
This section will look at both official and non-governmental conflict reso-
lution initiatives. Concerning the official negotiations, we will see that in the
current process there are conflicting priorities for the twin imperatives of
finding an immediate versus a long-term sustainable peace. Looking at the
non-official peace initiatives, we will ask how they can help to avoid a situ-
ation where the immediate peace agreement once again becomes a trigger for
future violence, because it has failed to adequately address the underlying
causes of the conflict, that is exclusion, the distribution of political and eco-
nomic power, ethnic identities, and the position of refugees. Finally, we ask
how the peace processes deal with the question of environmental facton. In
sum, while there is much promise in the various peace processes, both offi-
cial and civil society initiatives are threatened by a lack of domestic and inter-
national political will to support real social transformation.
Official peace initiatives have taken many forms since 1993. There have
been repeated domestic attempts at reconciliation between 1993 and 1996.
which did not prove to be successful at defusing or allaying ethnic tensions.
The failure of the 1994 power sharing Convention de Gouuernement
(Convention of Government) even served as the justification for Buyoyaa's
1996 coup. Regional and international peace interventions included an OAU
military observer mission from 1993 and the naming of UN, EU and US spe-
cial representatives. These initiatives had little effect. The main internation-
al and regional initiatives - sanctions and the Arusha peace process - did
have significant, but very ambivalent effect^.'^
The 1996 imposition of sanctions and withdrawal of aid were intended to
pressure Buyoya to restore parliament, allow opposition political parties, and
begin "immediate and unconditional" negotiations with all parties to the con-
flict. In fact, the sanctions had the effect of radicalising Burundian politics,