114 Scarcity and Surfeitthus marginalising moderates among both Hutus and ntsis. Commentators,
such as Jan van Eck, evaluate the sanctions as having been counterproduc-
tive and possibly prolonging the conflict.73 The rebel groups, especially the
CNDD, felt legitimised by the sanctions, and were not hurt economically,
since they were based outside Burundi. They therefore had no incentive to
negotiate with the government, since for some time they had reason to expect
outright victory. The government elite and military, on the other hand, did
feel the economic and political pressure of the sanctions, but managed large-
ly to pass the physical hardship on to the population, while maintaining their
own standard of living through large-scale smuggling. The effects of the sanc-
tions were also soon undermined by the lack of enforcement or active breach
of the embargo by some neighbouring countries, such as the DRC. Sanctions
were lifted in January 1999 and international aid was resumed, as a sup-
porting incentive for negotiations, which had the effect of strengthening
Buyoya's position.
Since 1998 the official peace process has been framed in a series of meetings
in Arusha, Tanzania, led first by President Nyerere of Tanzania, since mid-1999
by former South African President, Nelson Mandela and more recently by
Deputy President Jacob Zuma. This process is seen as the key to future peace
in Burundi, but may in practice legitimise a continuation of the war.74
The negotiations have led to the signing of an agreement in August 2000 -
the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi - which
addresses most of the underlying causes we have identified in a detailed and
constructive fashion. The content of the agreement was worked out in five
committees, chaired by international experts, on:
the nature of the conflict;
democracy and good governance;
peace and security;
reconstruction and economic development; and
guarantees for implementation of the peace accord.
The three completed protocols (1, 2, and 4) "outline a clear and precise action
programme which seeks to move Burundi towards reconciliation, democracy
and reconst~uction':~~ The report of Committee IV on reconstruction and
development addresses the issues of how to reintegrate refugees, the need for
political inclusion, and the need to restructure the domestic economy.
Increased investment in the rural and agricultural sectors is included. Difficult
political issues such as the reinstatement of refugee property and the need to
reform the ownership of Burundi's economy are clearly noted and agreed,
amounting to a clear plan for redistributing the riches of the country."
The problem with the peace agreement in Burundi's case is not, therefore,
the content, but rather the likelihood of implementation. Notably, the two