itself would show it not to be a genuine law of nature. If laws of nature are construed in
this way, then it seems that no law of nature can “survive” an exception. And so it is
sometimes suggested that the Humean concept of a miracle is logically incoherent. The
idea of a genuine law of nature is incompatible with the idea of a violation or exception.
If that is so, then miracles (according to this definition, of course) are logically
impossible after all.
What is needed for a coherent concept of miracle along these lines, then, is some notion
of a genuine law of nature that allows for the law to survive in the face of some
exceptions. The law need not be able to survive an unlimited number of exceptions, but it
must be able to survive some. There are perhaps several ways of doing this. Here is one
such way.
Let us say that a law of nature is constituted by a structural fact or set of facts in the
natural world, something in the natural order that generates a uniformity in the
phenomena of that world. So, for example, the uniform blackness of crows is presumably
due to some genetic facts. These genetic facts, then, would constitute, or would be part
of, a law of nature. But there would also be a universal generalization that would
“correspond to,” or would be “associated with,” that law of nature. The universal
generalization would not be constitutive of the law, and it would not be entailed by the
law. The generalization, however, would be a true description of the world if nothing
outside of the natural order interfered with the operation of the corresponding law of
nature. That is, if nothing outside of the natural order interfered with the expression of
the genetic facts, then the generalization that all crows are black would in fact be a true
description of the world. But the law of nature does not guarantee that there is nothing
outside of the natural order, and therefore it does not guarantee that there will never be
anything that interferes with the operation of the law. Consequently, the law of nature
does not entail the truth of the corresponding universal generalization.
This corresponding generalization is the place where a violation of a law of nature will
become evident or noticeable. That is, the occurrence of a white crow would be a
counterexample to the generalization. It would make the generalization false. However,
because the generalization did not constitute the law, and because the law did not entail
the generalization, the counterexample would not falsify the law. The exception would
not impugn the genuineness of the law. And so the law could remain as a genuine law of
nature in the face of the counterexample. The law and the counterexample could coexist
in reality.
It is an interesting, and perhaps significant, fact that there is a structural parallel here with
the logic of statute laws. It is, of course, often said that laws of nature are quite different
from the laws in legal codes. Nevertheless, for hundreds of years it has seemed natural to
use the same term “law” to refer both to the laws of nature and to the laws in legal codes.
Laws in the legal sense are also associated with uniformities. The legal codes are
commands that are intended to influence human behavior and to impose on it certain
patterns of uniformity.
end p.309
Indeed, laws in the legal sense are often expressed by means of universal generalizations
about behavior: “All taxpayers shall file a return on or before 15 April.” These