my best to get my revised practice socially established. If I transformed my Aristotelian
practice into a Kantian practice in this way, I would not, as I see it, be worse off in terms
of fruits as a result of doing so. I would not lose the ability to deal well with my physical
environment. Nor would I lose access to a developed physical science, though some
reinterpretation of its metaphysical import might be required. I suppose I would not have
independent grounds on which to argue that the revised practice yields more accurate
beliefs than its Aristotelian ancestor or the Cartesian and Whiteheadian alternatives to it.
Even in that respect, however, I would not be worse off after the transformation than I
was before it. So I conclude that sitting tight with my Aristotelian practice would not be
the only rational course in our hypothetical situation. It would also be rational for me to
transform that practice
end p.399
into a Kantian practice. Each of these courses of action would be rationally permissible;
neither would be rationally required.
And, of course, our hypothetical situation remains, in the relevant respects, parallel to the
actual situation in regard to competing mystical practices. Hence, again by parity of
reasoning, though it is rational for practitioners of CMP to continue to engage in it, this is
not the only rational course for them to follow, there being more than one thing it is
rational to do in the face of competing mystical practices. Another thing it is rational for
them to do is to revise CMP in a Kantian direction. Thus, I am convinced that Alston's
analogy actually supports this conclusion: “Each of these courses of action is rationally
permissible in the light of religious diversity. Neither of them is irrational, but neither is
rationally required” (Quinn 2000, 242). Moreover, absent any relevant dissimilarities, the
same goes for BMP and other socially established mystical practices that are not
demonstrably unreliable and enjoy significant self-support.
The situation would obviously be rather different if we were not in Alston's worst-case
scenario. If I had independent grounds on which to base an argument that my Aristotelian
practice yields more accurate beliefs than either its Cartesian and Whiteheadian
competitors or the proposed Kantian revision, then the only rational course would indeed
be to sit tight with it. Similarly, if a cumulative case argument for the truth of Christianity
provided them with independent grounds on which to base an argument that CMP yields
more reliable beliefs than either rivals such as BMP or the revisionary Kantian practice,
then the only rational course for its practitioners would be to sit tight with CMP. But I
doubt that sitting tight with CMP will be the only rational course for them unless they
come up with such a cumulative case argument. So I concur with Wainwright's verdict:
“Alston's defense of CMP is impressive and, on the whole, convincing. To be fully
successful, however, I believe it must form part of a persuasive cumulative case argument
for the Christian world-view” (2000, 224). But Alston does not provide such an
argument, and, as far as I can tell, no one else has done so either. So, though I regard
Alston's response to the epistemological challenge of religious diversity as the best recent
attempt to address it, I judge that it falls short of being fully successful in its own terms.
The force of the challenge, though reduced, has not been altogether dissipated as a result
of his efforts.